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STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN & CAMILLE STOWE, 
Plaintiffs and R e s p o n d e n t s , 
vs. 
CARPET GIANT 
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
CIVIL NO. 870061-CA 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. D i d t h e p a r t i e s m o d i f y the initial c o n t r a c t to 
s u p p l y l i n o l e u m , c a r p e t and p a d d i n g by t h e i r s u b s e q u e n t 
conduct which consisted of: 
a. The r e f u s a l of the Defendant to supply and install 
the floor coverings under the intial bid; 
b. The r e n e g o t i a t i o n of the contract and the agreement 
to perform the contract at a compromised amount; 
c. The p a y m e n t by the P l a i n t i f f s to the Defendant of 
the compromised and agreed upon amount; and, 
d. The s u p p l y and i n s t a l l a t i o n of the floor covering 
under the modified terms and/or the new agreement. 
2. W e r e the P l a i n t i f f s entitled to damages because of 
the i n c r e a s e d cost of the floor coverings where the parties 
e n t e r e d into a m o d i f i c a t i o n or a new c o n t r a c t b e f o r e the 
installation of the floor coverings began. 
3. W e r e the Plaintiffs entitled to damages arising out 
of the d e l a y in the c o m p l e t i o n of the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the 
floor covering, and if so in what amount? 
4 . W e r e t h e P l a i n t i f f s e n t i t l e d to d a m a g e s f o r 
emotional distress and mental s u f f e r i n g ? 
5. D i d t h e P l a i n t i f f s s u f f e r any d a m a g e s w h i c h are 
compensable under Utah Law, and if so, in what amount? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
C o u n s e l for the C a r p e t G i a n t was not p r e s e n t at the 
s m a l l c l a i m s t r i a l and did not have the b e n e f i t of the 
t r a n s c r i p t w h e n t h e D o c k e t i n g S t a t e m e n t was f i l e d . The 
r e c i t a t i o n of facts contained in the Docketing Statement was 
b a s e d upon the r e c o l l e c t i o n of one of the o f f i c e r s of the 
Carpet Giant as to the facts presented at the trial. 
The f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t of f a c t s was prepared after a 
review of the transcript of the p r o c e e d i n g s . 
1. The P l a i n t i f f s met with an agent of the Defendant, 
s h o w e d him f l o o r p l a n s f o r ' t h e i r h o m e and r e q u e s t e d a bid 
for the i n s t a l l a t i o n of carpet, .padding and linoleum. (See 
page 4 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
2 . T h e D e f e n d a n t ' s agent m a d e a bid f r o m the f l o o r 
p l a n s and gave a written bid to the Plaintiffs in the sum of 
$ 8 9 4 . 6 0 . (See page 4 of the transcript.) 
3. M r s . S t o w e t e s t i f i e d that a two foot concrete wall 
s e p a r a t e d the l i v i n g room from the dining room. (See page 
24 of the transcript.) 
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a. The P l a i n t i f f s asked t he D e f e n d a n t ' s agent i f the 
b i d i n c l u d e d t h e c a r p e t t o c o v e r t h e c o n c r e t e w a l l . The 
P l a i n t i f f s t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 
"THE COURT: D i d t h e y , a t t h a t t i m e , know 
t h e r e was a w a l l to be covered? 
MRS. STOWE: Yes. 
MR. S T O W E : Y e s , t h e y d i d . We t a l k e d about 
t h a t , h a v i n g the s t a i r s wrapped, and I guess it's 
c a l l e d t h e s k i r t s on the s t a i r s that go up the 
side of the st a i r s . " 
M r . S t o w e ' s t e s t i m o n y is c o n f u s i n g and a p p e a r s to 
i n d i c a t e that the S t o w e s thought the court was asking about 
w r a p p i n g the s k i r t s on the s t a i r w a y not c a r p e t i n g the two 
foot concrete w a l 1 . 
b. W h e n t h e D e f e n d a n t w a s a s k e d if t h e w a l l w a s 
i n c l u d e d in the original bid, the Defendant's agent (Thayne) 
t e s t i f i e d that w h e n the P l a i n t i f f s asked about the wall he 
indicated it was not included in the bid. He testified: 
"THE C O U R T : Then did you--did they tell you 
about the wall when they came in originally? 
T H A Y N E : T h e y mentioned something, you know, 
t h a t t h e y p o s s i b l y , or aske d me a w a y that t h e y 
s h o u l d do i t , and I said — I w a s n ' t s u r e what I 
( S i c ) wall l o o k e d like until I w e n t and measured 
i t , and I t o l d t h e m t h e y s h o u l d talk to t h e i r 
c o n t r a c t o r . " (See page 24 of the tr a n s c r i p t . ) 
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c. The o r i g i n a l b i d makes no r e f e r e n c e to a w a l l to be 
c a r p e t e d . (See the c o n t r a c t a t t a c h e d , E x h i b i t " A " . ) 
d . M r . H o l t , an o f f i c e r of t h e D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t t h e two f o o t c o n c r e t e w a l l in the home was an i tem t h a t 
t h e c o n t r a c t o r d i d not f i n i s h and cover w i t h shee t rock as i t 
shou ld have. (See page 15 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
e. Mr. Ho l t t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 
"MR. HOLT: I t ' s i m p o r t a n t f o r you t o know, 
t h a t number o n e , i t i s n ' t i n t h e e x t r a s , and 
number t w o , c o n t r a c t o r s d o n ' t l e a v e t h o s e i n a 
home. . . . T h e - - w h e n c o n t r a c t o r s b u i l d a home, 
t h e y d o n ' t l e a v e a c o n c r e t e w a l l b e t w e e n t h e 
d i n i n g room and t h e k i t c h e n , t h a t i s n ' t - - I mean, 
i t i s n ' t d o n e . Tha t i s no t i n d u s t r y s t a n d a r d s , 
t h e y f i n i s h i t w i t h s h e e t r o c k and i t ' s p a i n t e d or 
s o m e t h i n g e l s e . Now, i f they wanted to ca rpe t i t 
a f t e r t h e i r shee t rock t h a t ' s f i n e . We d id t h i s as 
a f a v o r . I mean, i t i s n ' t w o r t h t a l k i n g a b o u t , 
i t ' s s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n ' t p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t . " 
( S e e p a g e 2 3 o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
f . Mr . H o l t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t between the 
p a r t i e s d i d no t i n c l u d e the c o n c r e t e w a l l e i t h e r as p a r t of 
t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g , or as an e x t r a . (See pages 15-16 of the 
t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
g . M r s . S t o w e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e c a r p e t f o r t h e 
c o n c r e t e w a l l was no t i n c l u d e d i n t h e b id or the c o n t r a c t , 
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bu t i n s t e a d was p r o v i d e d as a g r a t u i t o u s g e s t u r e . In t h i s 
r ega rd she t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 
"MRS. STOWE: Yes, when I f i r s t — when I f i r s t 
went t o T h a y n e , I s a i d , I have a w a l l t h a t drops 
o f f and i t ' s cement. I says , can t h a t be wrapped? 
He s a i d , c e r t a i n l y . The second t i m e he came out 
and he r e q u o t e d me, a f t e r h e - - I t o l d him t h a t I 
c o u l d n ' t a f f o r d i t , he s a y s - - I says , what about my 
w a l l , I s a y s , you h a v e n ' t i n c l u d e d t h a t c a r p e t , 
and he s a i d , t h a t w o n ' t be a b i g p r o b l e m , I ' l l 
t h r o w some i n f o r y o u , because i t does need to be 
w r a p p e d , you c a n ' t l e a v e open cement l i k e t h a t . 
(See page 16 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
3 . J u s t p r i o r t o t h e schedu led i n s t a l l a t i o n d a t e , the 
D e f e n d a n t ' s agen t went t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' house, which was 
n e a r i n g c o m p l e t i o n . When the De fendan t ' s agent a r r i v e d and 
l o o k e d a t t h e h o u s e , he d i s c o v e r e d t h a t he had made a 
s u b s t a n t i a l e r r o r i n t h e b i d , and he n o t i f i e d P l a i n t i f f s 
t h a t t h e a c t u a l c o s t o f i n s t a l l i n g the c a r p e t and l i n o l e u m 
wou ld no t be $ 8 9 4 . 6 0 , bu t i n s t e a d would be $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . (See 
page 5 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
4 . a. The P l a i n t i f f s o b j e c t e d to t h e new b i d , had a 
d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s a g e n t , a r r i v e d a t a 
c o m p r o m i s e d p r i c e and r e a c h e d an a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e 
D e f e n d a n t wou ld p r o c e e d f o r w a r d and i n s t a l l the c a r p e t and 
l i n o l e u m at a new ly ag reed upon amount o f $ 1 , 1 8 6 . 1 6 . The 
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o r i g i n a l bid w a s m o d i f i e d by w r i t i n g o v e r t h e bid and 
s t r i k i n g out the old f i g u r e s . (See Contract, Exhibit "A"; 
and see C o n t r a c t with Norwest Financial, dated September 11, 
1986, Exhibit "B".) 
b . M r s . S t o w e a p p e a r e d to be c o n f u s e d at the time of 
the trial and i n d i c a t e d the c o n t r a c t was signed at a later 
d a t e , but the c o n t r a c t d e m o n s t r a t e s that it was dated on 
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 , 1 9 8 6 , the n i g h t b e f o r e i n s t a l l a t i o n of the 
floor coverings commenced. 
In this regard, M r s . Stowe testified: 
" . . . [I]t will be a r o u n d , oh, a thousand, 
m a y b e e l e v e n h u n d r e d . . . " (See page 6 of the 
transcript.) 
11
 . . . T h a y n e b r o u g h t this document out 
to me the night they were laying the carpet and he 
s a y s , o k a y , h e r e ' s y o u r q u o t e , $ 1 , 1 8 6 . 1 6 is how 
much y o u ' r e going to owe u s . . . ." (See page 9 
of the transcript.) 
" . . . And he did a p p r o v e in the h o m e , he 
said it was 90 days s a m e as cash, and so I signed 
it. . . . 
"THE C O U R T : Did you read the contract before 
you SIGNED IT? 
M R S . S T O W E : Y e s , I did. . . ." (See pages 
9-10 of the transcript.) 
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c. In P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n for Summary D i s p o s i t i o n , the 
P l a i n t i f f s i n d i c a t e d that a g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d as to the 
contract amount before the installation began as f o l l o w s : 
" . • . T h e P l a i n t i f f s a g r e e d and asked at 
t h a t t i m e if the l i n o l e u m w o u l d be i n s t a l l e d on 
the f o l l o w i n g day, September 12, 1986. Mr. Hansen 
said that it w o u l d , that he w o u l d come out after 
work and at that time he would bring the contracts 
to sign." (See page 3 of P l a i n t i f f s ' M o t i o n . ) 
d. M r s . S t o w e testified at the trial that they reached 
a n e w a g r e e m e n t a n d a r r i v e d at a n e w c o s t f o r t h e 
i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g s on t h e 1 1 t h . She 
f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d that the i n s t a l l a t i o n did not c o m m e n c e 
until September the 12th. She testified as f o l l o w s : 
" . . . [ H ] e c a l l e d me the morning of the 11th 
a n d he a s k e d me i f he c o u l d come o u t and 
r e - m e a s u r e my home. . . CS]o I s a i d okay. . . So 
he showed up at 7 : 0 0 , 7 : 3 0 , went t h r o u g h , measured 
t h e w h o l e e n t i r e home and t h e n q u o t e d me 
$ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
. . . . My--my q u o t e f r o m ( i n a u d i b l e ) was a 
t h o u s a n d and f i f t y . I s a i d , o k a y , maybe i f i t ' s 
e l e v e n , I can come up w i t h $50, t h a t ' s no p rob lem; 
but s t i l l , i t was more than my f i r s t q u o t e . 
Than I s a i d , my l i n o l e u m was to be l a i d the 
1 2 t h . He s a i d no problem . . . " (See T r a n s c r i p t 
pages 5 -6 . ) 
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5. The ag reement r e a c h e d to s e t t l e the d i s p u t e and to 
c o m p r o m i s e t h e amoun t due f o r t h e c a r p e t and l i n o l e u m 
i n s t a l l a t i o n was made made b e f o r e t h e Defendant s t a r t e d to 
i n s t a l l t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g s . (See page 9 of the t r a n s c r i p t 
and see c o n t r a c t s i g n e d by P l a i n t i f f s , ) As a r e s u l t of a 
l a c k o f s t o c k o f t h e c a r p e t o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s , t h e P l a i n t i f f s had t o ag ree t o s u b s t i t u t e a 
d i f f e r e n t c a r p e t than the one o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d . Both the 
new amount and t h e new c a r p e t were ag reed upon b e f o r e the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n commenced. (See page 12 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
6 . The c o n t r a c t w i t h Norwest F i n a n c i a l was p r o v i d e d to 
e n a b l e t h e P l a i n t i f f s to f i n a n c e t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f t h e 
f l o o r c o v e r i n g s . (See page 17 o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t and see 
E x h i b i t " B " . ) 
7 . A f t e r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n , t h e P l a i n t i f f s compla ined 
of v a r i o u s r e p a i r s and a d j u s t m e n t s which needed to be made 
and t h e D e f e n d a n t r e s p o n d e d and made t h e r e p a i r s and 
a d j u s t m e n t s . There was an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t even though the 
r e p a i r s w e r e made t h e P l a i n t i f f s i n t e n d e d t o sue t h e 
De fendan t . (See T r a n s c r i p t at page 17 . ) 
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8 . T h e r e i s an i s s u e o f f a c t as t o w h e t h e r t h e 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s t a r t e d on t i m e . The i n s t a l l a t i o n was no t 
c o m p l e t e d i n one d a y , b u t i n s t e a d t o o k t h r e e days t o 
c o m p l e t e . (See page 13 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
9 . The P l a i n t i f f s compla ined t h a t the c a r p e t i n g on the 
s t a i r w a y s was n o t p r o p e r l y i n s t a l l e d . The D e f e n d a n t 
p r o v i d e d new c a r p e t and r e i n s t a l l e d t h e c a r p e t on t h e 
s t a i r w a y s . (See page 13 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
1 0 . A f t e r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of the f l o o r c o v e r i n g , Mrs . 
Stowe p a i d more t h a n two m o n t h s 1 w o r t h o f payments on the 
f i n a n c i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h N o r w e s t . (See page 10 o f t he 
t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
1 1 - When t h e c o u r t asked Mrs . Stowe what the bas is of 
her c l a i m f o r damages was she made the f o l l o w i n g s ta temen ts 
to the C o u r t : 
"THE COURT: How d i d you - -how d i d you a r r i v e 
at the thousand d o l l a r f i g u r e ? 
MRS. STOWE: I a r r i v e a t i t w i t h t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two c o n t r a c t s , t h e d i f f e r e n c e , 
and I added h a l f on the f i n a n c e c h a r g e - -
THE COURT: Okay. But t h a t ' s $500 and t h e 
two c o n t r a c t s are $450 i n the two c o n t r a c t s . 
- 1 0 -
MRS. STOWE: The — o k a y , t h e - - t h e f i n a n c e 
c h a r g e , t o f i n a n c e i t ove r 90 d a y s , which w a s n ' t 
a g r e e i n g u n t i l a f t e r 90 d a y s , b u t s e e , t h e y 
a p p r o a c h e d me i n 40 days a f t e r I even pu t t h e 
t h i n g i n . F i n a n c e — o r l a t e charges put on me now, 
t h a t i t ' s n o t h i n g f i nance —Norwest can h a n d l e . 
THE COURT: How much are those? 
MRS. STOWE: My p a y m e n t - - f i v e p e r c e n t of my 
p r e v i o u s b a l a n c e , w h i c h i s $ 9 5 0 , s o , you f i g u r e 
9 — 4 5 , $50 t h r e e t i m e s . So, they made my payments 
November 2 8 , s o , y o u ' v e got December, January and 
F e b r u a r y . And t h e n t h e r e s t , I 'm go ing on s t r i c t 
h a r r a s s m e n t and m e n t a l a n g u i s h and menta l abuse. 
I was p u t t h r o u g h a l o t , an e x t r e m e a l o t , t h e y 
g e n e r a l l y w o u l d n ' t even come o u t , w o u l d n ' t even 
l i s t e n t o me, t h e y ' d hang up on me, t h a t ' s w h a t - - " 
(See pages 20-22 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
1 2 . The f o r e g o i n g i n t e r c h a n g e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t the 
c o u r t was c o n f u s e d and t h o u g h t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the 
two c o n t r a c t a m o u n t s was $500 when i n f a c t i t was o n l y 
$289 .56 . 
1 3 . The C o u r t t hen made an a d d i t i o n a l i n q u i r y of Mrs . 
Stowe r e g a r d i n g her c l a i m f o r damages as f o l l o w s : 
"THE COURT: Are you go ing to base your c l a i m 
on t h i s c o n t r a c t , t h e $894 t h a t was made at t he 
s t o r e ? Or a r e y o u g o i n g t o b a s e i t on 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made a f t e r ? 
MRS. STOWE: I d o n ' t u n d e r s t a n d what y o u ' r e 
g e t t i n g a t . 
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THE COURT: The--this contract is for $894. 
MRS. STOWE: Right. 
MR. STOWE: Yes. 
1 4 . A f t e r a few a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r c h a n g e s , the Court 
made the following statement: 
"THE COURT: The r u l i n g o f t h e C o u r t i s a 
j u d g m e n t f o r $850 f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f s . . . " (See 
pages 24-25 of the t r a n s c r i p t . ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1 . The A p p e l l a n t ' s w r i t t e n b i d t o R e s p o n d e n t s t o 
i n s t a l l f l o o r c o v e r i n g s may have been an e n f o r c e a b l e 
c o n t r a c t . Tha t c o n t r a c t was subsequen t l y m o d i f i e d and /o r a 
new c o n t r a c t was e s t a b l i s h e d between the p a r t i e s . 
2 . The m o d i f i c a t i o n and/or the new c o n t r a c t became the 
b i n d i n g ag reemen t be tween t h e p a r t i e s and i t was ach ieved 
b e f o r e t h e P l a i n t i f f s pa id f o r the f l o o r c o v e r i n g and i t was 
a c h i e v e d b e f o r e t h e D e f e n d a n t s t a r t e d t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of 
t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g s . The P l a i n t i f f s p a i d D e f e n d a n t t h e 
amount r e q u i r e d under t h e t e r m s o f the m o d i f i c a t i o n and/or 
new c o n t r a c t . 
3 . P l a i n t i f f s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l y upon t h e 
o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t and c l a i m damages a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m when 
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t h e y p a i d t h e D e f e n d a n t the amount r e q u i r e d under the terms 
o f t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n a n d / o r new c o n t r a c t and t h e Defendant 
c o m p l e t e d t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of the f l o o r c o v e r i n g s under the 
terms of the m o d i f i c a t i o n and/or new c o n t r a c t . 
4 . The d e l a y i n t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f t h e f l o o r 
c o v e r i n g s was i n s i g n i f i c a n t , b u t even i f damages were 
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s f o r t h e d e l a y s , no ev idence of 
t h e damages a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m were i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e 
e v i d e n c e , so no damages c o u l d have been awarded f o r such a 
c l a i m . 
5 . No e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t i o n a l c o n d u c t on the p a r t of 
t h e D e f e n d a n t was i n t r o d u c e d w h i c h w o u l d g i v e r i s e t o 
damages f o r mental d i s t r e s s or s u f f e r i n g , and no ev idence of 
damages t h e r e f r o m were i n t r o d u c e d at the t r i a l and t h e r e f o r e 
no damages cou ld have been awarded f o r such a c l a i m . 
6 . The P l a i n t i f f s d i d no t s u f f e r any damages wh ich 
were compensable under Utah Law. 
7 . I f P l a i n t i f f s had b e e n e n t i t l e d t o damages 
a m o u n t i n g t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t 
and t h e m o d i f i e d c o n t r a c t , t h e amount of the damages would 
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h a v e b e e n $ 2 8 9 . 5 6 p l u s s o m e i n t e r e s t , n ot t h e $ 8 9 4 . 6 0 
erroneously awarded to Plai n t i f f s . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE P A R T I E S ENTERED INTO A NEW CONTRACT, 
A N D / O R M O D I F I E D THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT BY 
MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
I n PLC L a n d s c a p e C o n s t , v. P i c c a d i l l y Fish 'N C h i p s , 
I n c . , 28 Utah 2d 3 5 0 , 502 P.2d 562 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
" . . . E x c e p t w h e r e a c h a n g e , m o d i f i c a t i o n 
or a d d i t i o n to a c o n t r a c t may c o n f l i c t with the 
w e l l r e c o g n i z e d rule a g a i n s t v a r y i n g a w r i t t e n 
c o n t r a c t by p a r o l , t h e r e is nothing so sacrosanct 
a b o u t h a v i n g e n t e r e d into one a g r e e m e n t that it 
will p r e v e n t the p a r t i e s e n t e r i n g into any such 
c h a n g e , m o d i f i c a t i o n , e x t e n s i o n or a d d i t i o n to 
t h e i r a r r a n g e m e n t for doin g b u s i n e s s with each 
o t h e r t h a t t h e y m a y m u t u a l l y a g r e e . " ( I d. a t 
563.) 
In V -1 Oil C o m p a n y v. A n c h o r P e t r o l e u m C o m p a n y , 8 
Utah 2d 3 4 9 , 334 P.2d 760 (1959) the Utah Supreme Court held 
t h a t a l e t t e r , a t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n , and the p a r t y ' s 
c o n d u c t w e r e s u f f i c i e n t to m o d i f y a c o n t r a c t . The C o u r t 
stated: 
" D e f e n d a n t h a d t h e r i g h t t o r e j e c t 
p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n t e r o f f e r , but he l i k e w i s e had the 
r i g h t t o a c c e p t t h e same. I f de fendant wished to 
- 1 4 -
r e j e c t the c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l he shou l d have given 
r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e of his e l e c t i o n to do so and 
h a v i n g f a i l e d he c a n n o t t e r m i n a t e the m o d i f i e d 
c o n t r a c t b e c a u s e of what would have been a breach 
of t h e t e r m s of t h e o r i g i n a l p r o p o s a l b e f o r e 
modified. 
We are of the o p i n i o n that the l e t t e r , the 
t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n and d e f e n d n a t ' s c o n d u c t , 
a b s e n t any f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e , are s u f f i c i e n t to 
spell out a m o d i f i e d c o n t r a c t by which defendant 
a g r e e d to go a l o n g w i t h P l a i n t i f f . " ( I d . at 
762.) 
In Rapp v. M o u n t a i n S t a t e s T e l . & T e l . C o . , 606 P 
1189 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
" I t i s w e l l - s e t t l e d law t h a t the p a r t i e s to a 
c o n t r a c t may, by m u t u a l consen t , a l t e r a l l or any 
p o r t i o n o f t h a t c o n t r a c t by a g r e e i n g upon a 
m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e r e o f . Where such a m o d i f i c a t i o n 
i s a g r e e d u p o n , t h e t e r m s t h e r e o f g o v e r n t he 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s under t h e 
c o n t r a c t , and any p r e - m o d i f i c a t i o n c o n t r a c t u a l 
r i g h t s w h i c h c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e t e r m s o f t h e 
c o n t r a c t as m o d i f i e d mus t be deemed w a i v e d or 
excused. . . " ( I d . at 1191. ) 
I n D i l l m a n v . Massey F e r g u s o n , I n c . , 13 Utah 2d 1 
369 P.2d 296 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , the Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
" . . . * * * [ P l a r t i e s t o w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s 
may m o d i f y , w a i v e or make new terms r e g a r d l e s s of 
p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e c o n t r a c t s to the c o n t r a r y * * * 
. " " ( I d . at 298 . ) 
I n 17 Am J u r 2d C o n t r a c t s §459 a t page 9 2 4 , 
f o l l o w i n g s ta tement i s f o u n d : 
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"A c o n t r a c t may be superseded or m o d i f i e d by 
a n o t h e r c o n t r a c t , i n wh i ch case the superseded or 
m o d i f i e d c o n t r a c t i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as t h e 
p r i m a r y c o n t r a c t and t h e supe rsed ing or m o d i f y i n g 
c o n t r a c t as a s e c o n d a r y a g r e e m e n t . T h u s , t h e 
p a r t i e s t o a n y c o n t r a c t , i f t h e y c o n t i n u e 
i n t e r e s t e d and act upon a s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
w h i l e i t rema ins e x e c u t o r y , may by a new and l a t e r 
ag reemen t r e s c i n d i t in whole or i n p a r t , a l t e r or 
m o d i f y i t i n any r e s p e c t , add to or supplement i t , 
or r e p l a c e i t by a s u b s t i t u t e . " 
I n t h e c a s e a t h a n d , when t h e P l a i n t i f f s f i r s t 
c o n t a c t e d t h e D e f e n d a n t , t h e p a r t i e s may have c r e a t e d a 
b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t . The D e f e n d a n t gave a w r i t t e n b i d , t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s a c c e p t e d t h e b i d . The w r i t t e n b i d made no 
r e f e r e n c e to a c o n c r e t e w a l l . 
When D e f e n d a n t v i s i t e d the home under c o n s t r u c t i o n and 
d i s c o v e r e d i t had made a gross e r r o r i n i t s b i d , i t n o t i f i e d 
P l a i n t i f f s t h a t i t wou ld no t c o m p l e t e t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g 
under i t s i n i t i a l b i d . 
The p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , a r r i v e d a t a 
comprom ised f i g u r e , i n t e r l i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l b i d , s igned a 
c o n t r a c t f o r f i n a n c i n g at the m o d i f i e d f i g u r e , and the f l o o r 
c o v e r i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n was comp le ted . 
The f i n a n c e company p a i d t h e D e f e n d a n t and l o o k e d to 
t h e P l a i n t i f f s f o r p a y m e n t . The P l a i n t i f f s made two 
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payments on t h e f i n a n c i n g a g r e e m e n t , made c o m p l a i n t s about 
t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n and t h e Defendant a t tempted to s a t i s f y the 
P l a i n t i f f s by s e n d i n g p e o p l e t o t h e home to make r e p a i r s , 
and to r e p l a c e p o r t i o n s of the s t a i r w a y c a r p e t . 
The re i s s u b s t a n t i a l and u n c o n t r o v e r t e d ev idence t h a t 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t a new a g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d by t h e 
p a r t i e s , t h e new a g r e e m e n t was r e d u c e d to w r i t i n g , t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s s i g n e d a f i n a n c i n g ag reement at t h e m o d i f i e d 
p r i c e and the agreement was per formed by the p a r t i e s . 
Under t h e f a c t s of the case at hand, the p a r t i e s agreed 
t o m o d i f y t h e t e r m s o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t , to a l t e r the 
p r i c e , t o a l t e r some of t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n d e t a i l s and to 
a l t e r the c a r p e t s e l e c t e d . 
The p a r t i e s ag reed t o a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l 
c o n t r a c t , s i gned documents e v i d e n c i n g the m o d i f i e d c o n t r a c t , 
p a i d t h e amount r e q u i r e d by the m o d i f i e d or new c o n t r a c t and 
s u p p l i e d and i n s t a l l e d t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g c o n t e m p l a t e d by 
the new or m o d i f i e d c o n t r a c t . 
The P l a i n t i f f s c a n n o t now look to the o l d c o n t r a c t and 
ask f o r damages r e p r e s e n t i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between the cos t 
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of the fl o o r c o v e r i n g and i n s t a l l a t i o n as p r o v i d e d by the 
old and the new contract. 
POINT NO. 2 
THE M O D I F I E D C O N T R A C T BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES DID NOT REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT TO 
S U P P L Y AND I N S T A L L C A R P E T FOR THE 
CONCRETE WALL, BUT EVEN IF I T D I D , THE 
DEFENDANT S U P P L I E D AND INSTALLED THE 
CARPET AND THE P L A I N T I F F S HAVE SUFFERED 
NO DAMAGES THEREFROM. 
T h i s i s s u e i s a n o n - i s s u e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e 
D e f e n d a n t d i d s u p p l y and i n s t a l l ( a l t h o u g h g r a t u i t o u s l y ) , 
c a r p e t on t h e c o n c r e t e w a l l . 
I f P l a i n t i f f s h a v e b e e n damaged a t a l l , i t w o u l d be 
b e c a u s e t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n i s n o t t o t h e l i k i n g o f t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s . S i n c e no e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d as t o t h e c o s t 
o f r e p a i r i n g a n d / o r r e p l a c i n g t h e c a r p e t on t h e c o n c r e t e 
w a l l , t h e r e a r e no damages w h i c h c o u l d be a w a r d e d t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s on t h i s i s s u e . 
P O I N T N O . 3 
P L A I N T I F F S ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
A R I S I N G OUT OF THE D E L A Y I N THE 
INSTALLATION OF THE FLOOR COVERINGS. 
I n G r e g o r y v . W e b e r , 5 1 O r . A p p . 5 4 7 , 626 P . 2 d 3 9 2 , 
( 1 9 8 1 ) , t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s was c a l l e d upon t o 
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d e t e r m i n e the measure of damages arising out of the delay of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the home by the b u i l d e r . The Oregon Court 
s t a t e d that the m e a s u r e of d a m a g e s would be determined as 
fol1ows : 
" "Where t h e b u i l d e r commits a breach by de lay 
i n c o m p l e t i o n and t h e o t h e r p a r t y has been 
d e p r i v e d of the use of the f i n i s h e d p roduc t d u r i n g 
t h e p e r i o d of . d e l a y , the o r d i n a r y compensat ion f o r 
s u c h d e p r i v a t i o n i s t h e r e n t a l v a l u e o f t h a t 
p r o d u c t . T h i s i s t h e case even t h o u g h t h e use 
e x p e c t e d t o be made o f i t was no t t h e r e n t of i t 
t o o t h e r s , and even t h o u g h some o t h e r use of i t 
m i g h t have r e s u l t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t r e t u r n . . . . " 
( I d . at 396 . ) 
I n t h e case a t h a n d , t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e 
d e l a y o f 2 or 3 days f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e f l o o r 
c o v e r i n g s p r e v e n t e d the P l a i n t i f f s f rom moving i n t o the home 
when p l a n n e d . Even i f such e v i d e n c e had been i n t r o d u c e d , 
t h e damages f o r t h e 2 or 3 day d e l a y wou ld have been t h e 
r e n t a l v a l u e f o r t h e 2 o r 3 day p e r i o d . T h e r e was no 
ev idence i n t r o d u c e d conce rn ing the r e n t a l va lue of the home. 
I f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment i n c l u d e d an award to the 
P l a i n t i f f s f o r t h e l o s s of t h e r e n t a l v a l u e of t h e home 
d u r i n g t h e 2 day d e l a y e d i n s t a l l a t i o n , t h e damages were 
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g r o s s l y e x c e s s i v e in light of the reasonable rental value of 
the home. 
T h e r e is no e v i d e n c e or testimony in the record of any 
actu a l d a m a g e s a r i s i n g out of the delays in installation of 
the f1oor coveri ngs . 
S i n c e t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e of any dama g e s , there is no 
b a s i s u p o n w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d h a v e a w a r d e d 
Plaintiffs any damages on this issue. 
S i n c e t h e P l a i n t i f f s p a i d D e f e n d a n t f o r t h e 
i n s t a l l a t i o n , t h e a l l e g e d d a m a g e s f o r t h e d e l a y o f 
c o m p l e t i o n of t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n were most l i k e l y waived by 
the P l a i n t i f f s . 
POINT NO. 4 
THE P L A I N T I F F S WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES FOR MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL 
SUFFERING. 
I n Samms v . E c c l e s , 11 U t a h 2d 2 8 9 , 358 P .2d 344 
( 1 9 6 1 ) t h e Utah Supreme Cour t se t f o r t h the bas is upon which 
damages f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s and s u f f e r i n g c o u l d be 
awarded. I t s t a t e d : 
"Ou r s t u d y o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s , and of t h e 
a rgumen ts a d v a n c e d , c o n v i n c e s us t h a t , conced ing 
such a cause of a c t i o n may not be based upon mere 
n e g l i g e n c e , the best cons ide red view recogn i zes an 
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a c t i o n for s e v e r e e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , though not 
a c c o m p a n i e d by b o d i l y impact or physical injury, 
w h e r e the d e f e n d a n t i n t e n t i o n a l l y engaged in some 
c o n d u c t toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose 
of i n f l i c t i n g e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , or, (b) w h e r e 
any r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n w o u l d have known that such 
w o u l d r e s u l t ; and his actions are of such a nature 
as to be c o n s i d e r e d o u t r a g e o u s and intolerable in 
t h a t they o f f e n d a g a i n s t the g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d 
s t a n d a r d s of d e c e n c y and m o r a l i t y , . ." (Id. at 
346.) 
In t h e c a s e at h a n d , t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e of a n y 
i n t e n t i o n a l conduct with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
d i s t r e s s ; and t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e of any severe emotional 
d i s t r e s s ; and t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e of any d a m a g e s arising 
t h e r e f r o m . A b s e n t such a s h o w i n g , no d a m a g e s could have 
been awarded to Plaintiffs upon such a theory. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE P L A I N T I F F S D I D NOT S U F F E R ANY 
DAMAGES THAT WERE COMPENSABLE UNDER UTAH 
LAW. 
P l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m f o r damages a p p e a r t o a r i s e o u t o f 
f o u r e l e m e n t s : 
1 . T h e i r c l a i m f o r damages f o r t h e i n c r e a s e d c o s t o f 
t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a l b i d c o n t r a c t . T h i s i s s u e has 
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been t r e a t e d i n P o i n t No. 1 o f t h i s B r i e f and demonst ra tes 
t h a t P l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f on t h i s i s s u e , 
2 . T h e i r c l a i m f o r h a r r a s s m e n t , m e n t a l a n g u i s h and 
m e n t a l a b u s e . (See T r a n s c r i p t pages 2 0 - 2 1 . ) Th is i ssue has 
been t r e a t e d i n P o i n t No. 4 o f t h i s B r i e f and demonst ra tes 
t h a t P l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f on t h i s i s s u e . . 
3 . T h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the 
c a r p e t on t h e w a l l , and t h e i r v a r i o u s minor c l a ims about the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n in g e n e r a l . There was no ev idence or t e s t i m o n y 
i n t r o d u c e d a t the t r i a l of the d i m i n i s h e d va lue of the f l o o r 
c o v e r i n g s s o l d and i n s t a l l e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t , i f a n y , 
a n d / o r t h e c o s t t o r e p a i r o r r e p l a c e any u n f i n i s h e d or 
u n r e p a i r e d f l o o r c o v e r i n g s . There was t h e r e f o r e no bas i s 
upon w h i c h the t r i a l c o u r t cou ld have awarded any damages to 
P l a i n t i f f s upon t h i s c l a i m . 
4 . T h e i r c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g the t h r e e day i n s t a l l a t i o n 
t i m e of t h e c a r p e t as opposed t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d one day 
i n s t a l l a t i o n t i m e . T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e or t e s t i m o n y 
i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e t r i a l w h i c h d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e 
a d d i t i o n a l two days o f i n s t a l l a t i o n t i m e d e l a y e d t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s e n t r y i n t o t h e home. The re was no e v i d e n c e or 
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t e s t i m o n y of the r e n t a l v a l u e of the home and therefore no 
damages could have been awarded Plaintiffs on this issue. 
POINT NO. 6 
THE P L A I N T I F F S W E R E NOT E N T I T L E D TO AN 
A W A R D OF D A M A G E S , BUT IF THEY WERE, THE 
DAMAGES AWARDED WERE EXCESSIVE. 
As i n d i c a t e d in this B r i e f , t h e r e is no evidence upon 
w h i c h the trial c o u r t could have awarded any damages to the 
P l a i n t i f f s , u n l e s s t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e d that the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the original contract. 
If the trial court concluded that the original contract 
h a d n o t b e e n a b r o g a t e d , m o d i f i e d or c h a n g e d and t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f s w e r e e n t i t l e d to h a v e t h e f l o o r c o v e r i n g s 
i n s t a l l e d at the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t p r i c e , the trial court 
c o u l d h a v e awarded a judgment to the Plaintiffs in an amount 
equal to the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t and 
the a m o u n t a c t u a l l y p a i d , or in o t h e r w o r d s the difference 
between: 
Original contract price $894.60 
Subsequent contract price (1,184.16) 
Difference $289.56 
The trial c o u r t may also have c o n s i d e r e d the interest 
charge on the difference between the two amounts. 
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However , t h e t r i a l c o u r t cou ld not have awarded damages 
t o P l a i n t i f f s on any o t h e r t h e o r y s i n c e t h e r e was no 
e v i d e n c e or t e s t i m o n y upon w h i c h damages c o u l d have been 
r e n d e r e d u n d e r any o t h e r t h e o r y , and t h e t r a n s c r i p t 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y s u p p o r t s t h e c l a i m of D e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e 
c o n t r a c t was m o d i f i e d by t h e s u b s e q u e n t e x p r e s s agreement 
and conduct of the p a r t i e s . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l , upon r e v i e w i n g t h e t r a n s c r i p t , 
b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t meant t o say t h a t Defendant 
was o b l i g a t e d t o f u r n i s h and i n s t a l l the f l o o r c o v e r i n g s at 
t h e o r i g i n a l p r i c e o f $ 8 9 4 . 6 0 . I f t h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s 
a c c u r a t e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t shou ld have awarded.a judgment to 
t h e P l a i n t i f f s f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the two c o n t r a c t 
p r i c e s , i . e . $289 .56 . 
When t h e t r i a l c o u r t awarded a judgment f o r $850 .00 , i t 
e f f e c t i v e l y g a v e t h e P l a i n t i f f s t h e l i n o l e u m , c a r p e t , 
p a d d i n g , a n d i n s t a l l a t i o n f o r t h e t o t a l c o s t o f 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 2 0 0 . 0 0 . Th i s award bears no r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
t h e a l l e g e d l o s s s u f f e r e d by the P l a i n t i f f s and c o n s t i t u t e s 
a w i n d f a l l to the P l a i n t i f f s . 
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T h e r e is no e v i d e n c e upon w h i c h the c o u r t c o u l d have 
r e l i e d in arriving at such an excessive and seemingly unjust 
award. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT 
T h e A p p e l l a n t s e e k s a r e v e r s a l of the trial c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n and a d i s m i s s a l of P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint, no cause 
of action. 
The A p p e l l a n t seeks a determination that the Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to damages under any other theory. 
T h e A p p e l l a n t seeks a determination that Plaintiffs are 
not e n t i t l e d to any d a m a g e s , but in the event the Appellate 
C o u r t d e t e r m i n e s that P l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d to d a m a g e s 
b a s e d upon the d i f f e r e n c e between the two contract amounts, 
t h a t t h e a m o u n t a w a r d e d P l a i n t i f f s be r e d u c e d to t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e between the two c o n t r a c t s , plus the amount of the 
interest a p p l i c a b l e . 
ADDENDUM 
The f o l l o w i n g E x h i b i t s are a t t a c h e d to this Brief for 
the convenience of the Court: 
1. The judgment rendered. 
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2 . The o r i g i n a l b i d c o n t r a c t be tween t h e p a r t i e s . 
( E x h i b i t "A " ) 
3 . The N o r w e s t F i n a n c i a l C o n t r a c t s i g n e d by t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s . ( E x h i b i t "B" ) 
5. Copies of the f o l l o w i n g cases c i t e d : 
a . D i l l m a n v . M a s s e y F e r g u s o n , I n c . , 13 
Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . 
b . G r e g o r y v . W e b e r , 51 O r . A p p . 5 4 7 , 626 
P.2d 392, ( 1 9 8 1 ) . 
c . PLC Landscape C o n s t , v . P i c c a d i l l y F i sh 
N ' C h i p s , I n c . , 28 U t a h 2d 3 5 0 , 502 P . 2 d 562 
( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
d . Rapp v . M o u n t a i n S t a t e s T e l . & T e l . 
C o . , 606 P.2d 1189 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 
e . S annus v . E c c l es , 11 U t a h 2d 2 8 9 , 358 
P.2d 344 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . 
f . V - l O i l Company v . A n c h o r P e t r o l e u m 
Company, 8 Utah 2d 349, 334 P.2d 760 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . 
6. Copies of the following references cited, 
a. 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts §459 at page 924. 
Respectfully submitted, this ^ ^ d a y of April, 1987. 
JX 
L. Schoenhals 
;ney for Defendant 
and Appel1 ant. 
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Case r h 
JUDGMENT 
87^JC000GSC 
•'s matte? :ar... ^ : ^e :neouuft tor nearingor i the affidavit of plaintiff, and the defendant has been 
ser.e': -virn :ne affidavit of plaintiff and order to defendant, and return of service has been made The 
following parties appeared at the hearing: 
H Plaintiff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set, and the defendant's jefai ill has Deem entered. 
L j Both plaintiff arc ^e fe°nar: acoeared and presented evidence... 
s /CCC.L^ - cal 
__ _r<-/— / ^ Ziur costs, and 




LJ Both Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at Hearing. 
Clerk 
ro THE DEFENDANT ONL f: 
If the above judgment was granted in favor of the olaintiff. you now nave a judgment against you in 
the Circuit Court in the amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied with this judgment, /ou nave oniy 
FIVE. (5) DAYS from receipt of this notice to appeal the case to the District Court. 
HE PLAINTIFF ONLY: 
You should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five 
days from receipt of the notice to appeal the case. You must com olete the mailing certificate and file the 
original of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further coi Jrt action. 
I herebv ::et trn tl iat f i i laiied a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above 
named defendantfs) at / 7 
n\(y 
&L/£.^C. yCO-CL, / (' f'A T 
Address i V ^ 
Dated.? ^(.j; ,' !JU 1 ' r A 
T 'k&L<:<ys 0r77t^6 StGfrA TURi 
E X H I B I T " A 
U A H K t l UilA - -> L ¥-\j*-jr 
1340 SOUTH 40n WEST • SALT LAKE CI 17, MTnH 84 I 15 PHONE 484-5028 
DATE 
30006 
- J . V / " A u . ^ / ' • ' . ' ' ' c ^ ' " L \ . i. 
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l SAwES TAX 
! MATERIAL 
! ONLY 
"No s/ties lax wiil be cha'geo on any sale -hat we nsta! l . However, there wili 
ana landi ing charge of 50/3 to cover all warehouse handling and appf CJ 
? a servK 
^ taxes. '. HA\C'i_,,G 
'IF !\$~ALLEO 
*?<>. 
TERMS: Purchaser agrees :c .'^ aj-.o Daymen' 'n 'uM to the Se!ler at its off-ces at 1C40 Sou-" 
40C West. Salt La«e City. Utah, 84115 within tnree \3) days from 'he date of teller s mvoxa 
'0 the Purchaser, if not pa;d witrm 30 days from Jhe date of the invoice, a ; i :e Dookkeep*ng 
fee of 33.00 and interest of 1 J/<wo per month (21% par yean may be cnarged en the past due 
balance. Seller snaii retain a securty inte'est ;n any anc ail mater ia l supplied the "u'chassr 
unt;: pa.d for in full, if Purcnaser fails to mane payment as ret forth aoove. or otherwise agreed 
I to, Seller shall have the rignt to: (A) Enter upon Purchaser s premises and repossess the pur-
i cnased goods, with or witnout legal process, and either retain tne goods and a\< payments 
to that date as liquidated damages, or resell 'he goods for any price ootamaC'e and su3 Pur-
chaser for any remaining amounts due: or (Si Sue in any court of competent !unsc:r;t;on for 
the total amount outstanding. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs ct collection, including cost 
- of court and reasonable attorney's fees. Purchaser heresy submits to the luncdrct en c Sa.t 
I Lake Cttv and Cistr-ct Courts for anv collection proceedings. Purchaser acknowledges he 
j has read the foregoing document m its entirety and that he had received a copy 




I " ' ' 
I 
| 
Any cancellation of a special order is subject to a 2Q°c Service Charge. J
 ^ J, 
C 
J 
Mercnand;se held over 60 Jays .vi'l oe put cack in stccK witnout re'und o* money. 
y. 
? > / ? 3 f ^ J i A 
J\i IILJI i 
Q ;pptoc GOPY 
PUHCi iASER X 
329 838 G85 UT K C l M i L f r ^ i M U f H « . n , * , * * • < . . . w » «. * 
Dear Customer" We've written this Retail Instalment Contract in simple and easy-to-read language because we want you to uncii 
stand tts terms,. Please read your contract carefulfy and fee! free to ask us any questions you may have about it,' We use t 
words you and your to mean the Buyers. In the Insurance Statement, I means the one of you who is the principal income ean n 
The words we, us and our refer to the Seller indicated below. 
Last Vame 
BUYERS 3 * cJ \_\ ,? 
NAMES Last Name 
-T.vh A. 
First Name 
Middt f Initial 
1 DESCRIPTION Of GOOOS SOLO 
CASH PRICE iNCLUC 





Address \ J O \ \ ^ - rf\' W^W 
JLAJICL. J_ l i j _ 
rT / i £M 




Signed At- G-. ~ A l 
Creditor (Seller) 
(City and State) 




(Street. City, State, Zip) 
By: Z21/ll%p^^^ Date .f Cc fttract., 21 I I J. \7 _ 
(Owner, CJHicer or Firm Member) 
INSURANCE STATEMENT: Credit l ife and accident and health insurance Of» not re-
quired to obtain credit and wi l l not be provided unless you sign and agree to pay 
the addit ional cost. You may obtain property insurance from anyone you want that 
is acceptable to us. If you get property insurance from us. you wi l l pay the cost shown 
below The term of credit l i fe, accident and health, and property insurance starts on 
the date of this contract and ends on the original maturity date of this contract, THE 
PRINCIPAL INCOME EARNER IS THE PERSON TO BE INSURED: SIGN ON O N f LiNE ONLY. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES RENDERED/ 
MATERIALS FURNISHED 
i Insurance Type 
' Credit Life and 
: Accident and Health 






I desire credit 
and hi 
r«xJrt.40#in»i*Mn<flppdwKidtflt I I 8. Accident & Health Ins. $ 
MW^MM^lE^Wti <Jf|Y>!0i88 OMX £2!% .Oft ,KAT: i. 
C: Properly Insurance $ 
(Sign Here), 
ITEMIZATION O f AMOUNT FINANCED 
3. CASH PRICE (TotoQ 
4 AMOUNTS PAID TO OTHERS ON YOUR BEHALF 
To Insurance Company for Non-Filing Insurance 
5. SUBTOTAL — CASH PRICE PLUS NON-FILING 
INSURANCE PREMIUM (3 * 4) 
\1±UJL 
c?& 
l i i i tv \)L 
6. A. CASH DOWNPAYMfNT $ „ 
B. TRADE-IN $ . 
(Description) 
TOTAL DOWNPAYMENT 
7 UNPAID BALANCE 
„£r_ 
\%i ; i< 
8. AMOUNTS PAID TO INSURANCE COMPANIES I 
FOR CREDIT INSURANCE AND PROPERTY 
INSURANCE 
9 AMOUNT FINANCED I I ^JJ 
l desire credit life insurance only at 
the cost shown 
I desire neither credit life ms< 
nor accident and health insure 
10. FINANCE CHARGE 
* / 3 ; 
11,, TOTAL OF PAYMENTS >no) S IJJ^ 
12. TOTAL SALE PRICE 
A N N U A L 
PERCENTAGE RATE 
The cost of your credit 
as a yearly rate. 
n i 
F I N A N C E C H A R G E 
The dollar amount the 
credit wi l l cost you. 
3f-/C> 
A m o u n t F inance* 
The amount of credit 
provided to you or on 
your behalf. 
To ta l o f Puymex i t t 
The amount you wi l l have 
paid after you have made 
all payments as scheduled. 
$ A3;?5*3J2 
Tota l Sale Price 
The total cost of your purchase 
on credit, including your 
downpayment of $ 
/ ^?*- ^ 
Your payment schedule wi l l be-
Number of Payments Amount of Poymenti I W h a n Paymen ts a r e Due> 
i MONTHLY beginning one month (unless the first payment box is checked below) after the Date of this Contract 
: and continuing on the same day of each fol lowing month until fully paid. (However, if our substantial performance 
! under this contract occurs 10 or more days after the Date of this Contract, then the first payment is due one month 
j (uniess the first payment box is checked below) after that date and the remaining payments are due on the same 
! day of each fol lowing month until fully paid. The date of substantial performance is estimated to b e ' 
. \ 19 but if this date blank is not f i l led in, the first payment is due one month 
j / j ( t n r ee months if the first payment box is checked below) after the Date of ..this Contract). 
' j ^ The first payment is due THREE MONTHS after the Date of this Contract (or after the date of substantia! perfor-
mance if that date is indicated above). Other payments are due on the same day of each fol lowing month 
until fully paid 
otherwise, this contract is unsecured 
ie late portion of the scheduled poymen 
Secur i t y : If any goods are being purchased under this contract you give us a security interest in those goods 
Late Charge : If any part of a payment is more than 10 days late, we may charge a late charge equal to 5% of 
,ir 55 CO whichever is greater 
P r e p a y m e n t : If you pay off early, you may be entit led to a refund of pan of the finance charge-
See your contract documents for any addtttonal information about nonpayment default any required repayment in full before the scheduled dote and pi 
refunds 
We agree to sell and you agree to purchase the goods services and materials described above. You promise to pay us the Total of Payments shown above ai 
to make payments according to the payment schedule shown above. The terms on the reverse side are also part of this contract If you agree to be bound 
all of the terms of this contract please sign your name below, Al l persons signing this contract are equally responsible for paying * n full 
If you are buying a used motor vehicle with this contract, other than a motorcycle, federal regulat ion may requir 
a special buyers guide to be displayed on the window. 
THE INFORMATION YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS PART OF THIS CONTRACT. INFORMATION O 
THE WINDOW FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
NOTICE 
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTO'R COUL 
ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREO 
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDEI 
Buyer Acknowledges Receipt of a Copy of this Contrad 
BUYER: ^C^fcf* "* <^/£Z^Z>~~ 
sold, Jhe principal income « 
•'&/&<£ ^5 6is:4 
,t*YER: 
JOTICE: ADD1TIONALJERMS AND PROViSTONS APPEAR ON THE REVERSE SiD 
earner signs j i ^ re i 
iU /V i J j i *-% UF*M? d 
YOUR PROMISE TO PAY AND THE TERMS OF REPAYMENT: To pay your contract, you promise »o pay us the Ta^oi of Payment shtewrvon^e r t v < r i r : 
side which includes finance Charge at the Agreed Rate of Finance Charge Per Yeai. You agree U) make p$>wy>erv*s according, te 4ri^pyo*er>tJ&chjeduJe 
shown *n the reverse side. , • . ( . . - . , . . • . _ _ _ _ . • 
J • • • * • • .' , . •• - • " i . , 0 . . * c D '• - ^ 
RATE OF FINANCE CHARGE: You promise »o pay Finance Charge a^ the Agreed Rate of finance Charge P«r Year urtttf paid including after maturity 
or judgment. The Agreed Rat« of Finance Charge Per Year is the Annual Percentage Rate shown on the reverse side. "* 
LATE CHA*RGE: If you're more than 10 days late id making any part of a payment; you promise to pay a jo t * charge of 5% of the lot* portion of the 
scheduled payment or S5.00, whichever is gnatT. ' ' ' ••• x>' 
DEFAULT — ENTIRE 1ALANCE DUE: If you don't make a pp/ment on time or if you violate the term* of t n.fr'frpniroct, you'll be m default. When that 
happens, /ou agree that without giving you advance noTtte, we can require you to pay thetremaining balance of this contract at once (less any unearned 
finance charge). . / « • ' • .^ , .'• _^ ' .->( >» 
COLLECTION FEES: If you default and we refer this contract to an attorney, you agrSe to pay reasonable attorney fees You also agree to pay actual 
court costs and other collection expe.ues we incur while enforcing any se«urjty interest we have uAder this contract to the ea^erit^pecmftted by law. 
In addition, if a check or oiher instrument used to make a payment on your contract is not honoredbecause'of insutfTcienTfunds or T5r ctrty otffer reason 
fe'-ceof an error by us) you agree to pay us a $10 charge. 
TITLE TO PKCMHERTY: If goods are described in item 1 on the reverse side, we retain title to the property, untitjhis, contract is pdldTn tul l . During that 
Nme you agree not to self or mortgage the property. However, you may possess and use the property"'as long'as you're not in default. 
INSURANCE O N PROPERTY: !f goods are described in item 1 on the reverse side, you promise to kee^fherf fupy^ruured witn a company we accept. -
If requested, you will deliver any insurance policy to us and will arrange for the policy to provide for payment to us in case of loss. If you fail tp obtJ-tfJtofT^ 
this insurance we can obtain it for you and add the cost to the balance of your contract. . , . , - , . . •.,. ^.po 
DEFAULT — REMEDIES: if you are in default, we can use any of the remedies available to us under^he'Crriifoirm Commercial Code or any other law. 
This ir.Judes-taking possession of any property soid jnder this contract and selling it according to law. If we sell any such property, we will opply the 
saTe proceeds'to the ETaTance on" this contract. If these pro'ceeds are nd^enough to pay this CflLfitract,in f u ^ L y O i / ^ i ^ t i t l have t O M ) ; the remaining
 :fj 
balance where permitted by Section 70C-7-101 of the Utah.Consumer Credif Code. However, you arm entfTleo,f^ftn;y^*CS|*s.£ l^#Spl^*ffdJtT£P* more 
than you owe us. 
PROPERTY SOLD AS IS: Unless a specific written warranty is included on the reverse side, any property sold under this contract is sold AS IS. This 
paragraph does not affect any warranties given by a manufacturer or other third party 
OTHER RIGHTS: You agree that any delay or failure to enforce our rights under this contract does not prevent us from enforcing any rights at a later time. 
NATURE OF PROPERTY — WAIVER O f LUNS: You agree that aqy property sold under this contract will remain personal property and will not become 
a fixture even if attached to real property. We agree to waive all liens on any real property which is or will be used as your principal residence. 
PREPAYMENT OF CONTRACT: If you fyBfXiy this contract, we II reiund any unearned finance charge as required by section 70C-3-101 of the Utah Consumer 
Credit Code. 
RETENTION OF CONTRACT: You agree that we can keep the original copy of this contract aiter-it has b a a n p a ^ }&*&<**' ^••y^coftifaKee. »*'>_>ceqt ewvjqwsnt 
TRANSFER OF CONTRACT: You agree that rf we sell or Ir^miw Ibis contract taanot f t« r lpe* j£^ l f^ |^^^ 
that we now hove.. -> . ,. >"°' ' "*J 0 ' ' J ' n * qc q >' -^ v. < ^ T O-» ' . " .C . -
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SELLER'S ASSIGNMENT AND WARRANTY 
: H ; i.a OT HO?H^ 1HT l\ S_li..<.A? ?MCOW! • , / * » * « . 
"%mmiKmMm ft^S^Wl i^ ««w watwwwai-i" ••^•••••^•••: n&*r*. 
(Full Corporate Name and Address) 2 .-<• c«WJ>nr - i w ^ A : 
or order ail right, title and interest in and to the contract set forthlabove and on the reverse side-hereof artd-the property covered thereby and gut hoi ftfe^ . 
said assignee, or order to do every act and thing necessary to collect and discharge the same, including the right toendorse any check or draft payable,, 
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WITHOUT tECOUtM 
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:nb«d ih«r«tn that said property hat b**n <_«Miv«r«d into th« p—<>»«4on 
Thi* asiignmant is mads WITHOUT RECOUtSE, 8<c«pt at to th« following warrantiai and r«pr«s«ntation* rnao* oy lh« i*Hl. 
•o-wtl: TVvot th« soid coitroct i* o bona fk_W on» ond wo« ocluaily «*«cut»d by th« ' L " '*" " J 
is lh« subject o. said contract is truly and accurately uw»_. .-.wvi n w n mui *u u g^w IT ,,lJ» " " u v u w w •!••« »< H » " "••»••"' 
of said Buyar: that th« omount racttad in said contract as having baan racaivad upon tha signing tharaot as part of I ha purchosa 
once of said proparty was actuolly paid m cash and or by property racaivad in troda at no '^— •*- —*• —' —•'" —••— 
that SaHar has compiiad with o/l appiicabla 'edarol and stata laws in connection with said c 
L
 ' •"• " " oy tha 8uyar that tha Sailar ho» ma M l ond compiate Htla ._ _._., , ... 
st by vtrtua o* said contract: ttwt th» amount owad upon said contract at ttta lima of 
> ora no claims or dafansas with raspact to tha said contract: that said contract 
> its tarms: that thara nova baan no rapra.antot.ons 
ond tht 
voiua, 
that.soid contract is aol 
property sobiact c»i\( to ,_... ._ right ol coneailat.-
rh« ngrtts of sotd Suyar which 
is corractly statao th^rmtn that thara 
and la^oliy antorcaobla occordir 
which ora not contamad in said 
Should any of tha .oragoing reorasantotfons or warrontias ba falsa, than wa a v to purehosa on damond from sold oasignaa 
soid eontroct lor tha omount o* ma tha« unpaid ba'anca on send eootroct Vim eonaant to aatanalon* at payments ofCrtarotiO-M : 
of SOKJ eontroct which may be mad* by tha oetig-w*. it thara It any conflict bafwaan tha lorafO-Wf provisions ar_*___« t t M 
of any Ganarai Dauiar Agraament batv-ean wa and tha aaetfpaa. wa-a»raa thai m * tanna at thai Caaaroi Oiataf _. j w i » i p t . 
will cootrol 
SELLER K+^C&'.iS. ^J.4^r/.. 
/ .{Corporate Firm or T rod* N a m e of Deoier) 
J (Owner , O i f k e r or Firm Member ) 
a I amount* oua and la bkeoma d m ^ r t s a t»jr/i»^af-_M,_ii»,u_ia BU, 
on^ oil coats, including reotonob/f gttornay s ' • • « , incurred 1* 
coflaetlng tha money or ottampting tha codaction tfSarao^ or tna * 
•nldtceflvpnt ot any rights under said contract or under t+vls 
(MJAfeAtfTYvand w%here4y consant thot aKtension as to the ' 
^ l i n n >i mmtmmm*mmrtlm »aea tm iha SmyarT nlhai • • » • • • •» -
aht maturity and hwf t r . worn* of^Wof Hw o» _M*wtaii«nt. 1 
unda«a»§B«4,.j«-_Mp^-Q%|Hf oi ao_*-p_^ra^^t •»a)-.fl9P*' 
(Corporate Firm or Trade N o m e of Dooier) ~t 
( O w n e r , OHicor or Firm *mmb*r) 
I 2 f / 8 3 i G * 5 (UF) a p ^ o r t j » . : 
, '.'. •• A-tc **'* ' ' - ~ > f •'<.'•• " " " " 
• ni-v t»r'' n o t .. *'_•'.*;-fib 
- J »-_•) _>oy 1 
'* /HAqTM^O YMA 23Ql5»iJ3VO ri«-^-« ^ O O M I W 3HT 
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self-serving atmosphere emphasized by a 
seven-year progressive psychiatric difficul-
ty, highlighted by a pass at the defendant 
with one of Brigham Young's antique 
brooms, does not lend itself to any sub-
stantial degree of clarity or convincernent, 
justifying avoidance of the documents. It 
seems that the trial court concluded as 
it did, not so much because of proven prac-
ticed fraud, but because of the differential 
in intelligence and business acumen of the 
parties, coupled • with a considerable land 
value appreciation from, time of deeds to 
t r ia l I believe I reasonably could have 
arrived at the result here, had plaintiff's 
theory been one of "no contract" by virtue 
of incompetency to contract and carry on 
ordinary busmtss affairs by one oi the 
parties. In such event it would be a case 
of invalidity since the inception, not one -~>f 
a contract made, but voidable on -on -
equitable grounds. 
The trial court, appears to have batud his 
conclusion, at least in part, on the mental 
deficiency of plaintiff at the time of the trial, 
—not seven years before,—during which 
period certain degenerative processes may 
have produced a change that may not have 
been reflected seven years before. 
In connection with this time lapse, and in 
harmony with the authorities cited by de-
fendant as to the inadmissibility of hand-
writing exemplars furnished after trial be-
gan,1 not before, where the trustworthiness 
of their genuineness would be eminently of 
more probative value, I believe their intro-
duction erroneous to show forgery, not 
only because oi their questionable probative 
value, but because a seven year period of 
time in the lives of persons in the same age 
group as plaintiff oftentimes shows a more 
rapid decadence in handwriting ability and 
similarity than it does mental degeneration. 
I am unprepared to say that, assuming a 
100% verity of the facts related in the main 
opinion, there is that quantum and quality 
I. 72 A.L.R.2d 1277: "Thus, in most of 
such cases it has been held or recognized 
tlu.it a signature or specimen writing 
made after the controversy arose and 
of proof that may be said to prove clearlv 
and convincingly that a seven-year-old, 
recorded instrument, acknowledged in a rep-
utable attorney's oftice, should be avoidable 
on the grounds of fraud, particularly when 
such facts are adduced by a person of this 
lady's age whose mentality at the time of 
the trial, not before, was doubtful even in 
the contemplation of the trial court 
^j V v
 | 
O | KEY H UMBER SYSTEM 
1 ;;v, :•; '.. 
•••I. - OILL\M'J 1 •
 s .Inn.-; '• r ^ * n 
Sor v;oo. P ja: n 1; n \-\.: ne s p o rs c»- n t, 
v. 
ERGU5QN- I N C . L^ ic i ioa i i t 
and Appe l lan t , 
No. 9498. 
Supremo ('ourr <>r' •'* :'\ 
March 1, r.ni'j. 
A dealer brought an action against a 
manufacturer for breach of an agreement 
by the manufacturer to buy back certain 
merchandise and to pay a performance 
bonus to the dealer. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., 
rendered a judgment for the. dealer, and 
the manufacturer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Wade, C. J., held that the acceptance 
and cashing of the manufacturer's check by 
the dealer after the dealer protested that 
the check did not take care of all that was 
due him under his agreement with the man-
ufacturer did not amount to an accord and 
satisfaction, though the letter which accom-
panied the check stated that the check rep-
resented the amount due the dealer in full 
to complete buy-back on the dealer's ac-
count, where the dispute was not as to the 
for the purpose of being used as a 
standard of comparison with the disputed 
writing cannot be used as an exemplar 
on behalf of the person making it." 
DILLMAN v. MASSEY FERGUSON, INC. Utah 2 9 7 
a t e as 369 P.2d 296 
amount found due for items which were 
bought back by the manufacturer, but as 
to whether the manufacturer breached its 
contract by refusing to buy back the items 
that the manufacturer rejected. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Accord and Satisfaction <S=>II(2) 
Acceptance and cashing of defendant's 
check by plaintiff after plaintiff protested 
that check did not take care of all that was 
due plaintiff under agreement with defend-
ant did not amount to accord and satisfac-
tion, though letter sent by defendant with 
check stated that check represented amount 
due in full to complete recent buy-back by 
defendant, where dispute was not as to 
amount due plaintiff by defendant for items 
which were bought back by defendant, but 
as to whether defendant breached contract 
by refusing to buy back items rejected by 
defendant. 
2. Contracts €=^308 
Trial court did not err in requiring 
manufacturer to pay dealer performance 
bonus, though dealer sales agreement re-
quired that it be in effect on August 31 in 
order to entitle dealer to bonus, and though 
dealer resigned dealership before that date, 
where dealer did not claim right to bonus 
under dealer sales agreement but under 
contract whereby manufacturer agreed to 
pay bonus to dealer for voluntarily termi-
nating dealer sales agreement. 
3. Contracts €=236, 316(1) 
Parties to written contract may modify, 
waive, or make new terms regardless of 
provisions in contracts to contrary. 
Kipp & Charlier, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
R. Earl Dillman, Roosevelt, for respond-
ent, 
WADE, Chief Justice. 
This appeal is from a judgment in favor 
oi Miles Dillman, doing business as Modern 
369 P.2d—19Va 
Farm Service, for breach of an agreement 
by Massey Ferguson, Inc., appellant here-
in, to buy back certain merchandise and to 
pay bonuses. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to respondent, the court, as the 
trier of the facts, having found them in 
his favor, it appears from the record that 
respondent had entered into what was desig-
nated as a dealer sales agreement with ap-
pellant, wherein respondent agreed to sell 
appellant's farm machinery and parts on 
conditions stated therein. Among the 
terms and conditions of this contract were 
provisions to pay volume and performance 
bonuses, and upon termination to buy back 
new, current company products and parts. 
While this contract was still extant appel-
lant Massey Ferguson desired to cancel 
respondent's dealership for it. Appellant 
offered to treat respondent Dillman better 
on buy-backs of parts and other items and 
to pay the bonuses if respondent would 
voluntarily terminate the sales agency. 
Respondent accepted this offer and signed 
the letter of resignation which had been 
presented to him at the time of the offer. 
Soon thereafter respondent Dillman in-
ventoried and prepared for shipment back 
to appellant all unused parts which were el-
igible for buy-back according to appellant's 
instructions. Appellant Massey Ferguson 
sent its own truck to pick up the goods 
it had agreed to take back. The unused 
parts were taken back by its truck driver 
to its distributing headquarters in Poca-
tello, Idaho, and at a later date this driv-
er returned for the items he was unable to 
load on his first trip. Appellant checked the 
parts sent back by respondent, accepted 
some and rejected others, which it shipped 
back to respondent. It then sent respondent 
Dillman a check covering payment only for 
the parts it had accepted. This did not 
include payment for the items known to the 
parties as whole goods and which had been 
taken by appellant's truck driver on a sec-
ond trip to respondent's place of business. 
Appellant Massey Ferguson also did not 
pay respondent the amount accrued on the 
298 uuih >-PORTER, 2d SEEIES 
performance bonus, nor for the rejected 
parts. 
Appellant contends the court erred in 
granting judgment for the amounts due for 
the rejected unused parts and other items 
because the acceptance and cashing of the 
check by respondent after protesting that 
it did not take care of all that was due him 
under his agreement with appellant amount-
ed to an accord and satisfaction, 
[1] There is no merit to this conten-
tion. The check as stated in the letter by 
appellant in forwarding it to respondent 
represented "the amount due in full to com-
plete recent buy-back on your account/' 
This amount represented all that was due 
for the items which they accepted. It was 
a liquidated amount for those items and 
respondent Dillman was not entitled to, nor 
did he claim, more for them. The dispute 
was not as to the amount found due for 
these items which were bought back by ap-
pellant Massey Ferguson, but as to wheth-
er it breached its contract by refusing to 
buy back the items it rejected. The ac-
cepting and cashing of a check which rep-
resented the actual amount due on items 
bought back by appellant is not such an act 
from which it can be implied that it was 
understood and intended by the parties that 
the dispute as to what items should be 
bought back under the agreement was set-
tled. The dispute as to what appellant 
had agreed to buy back was not related to 
the payment made for items actually bought 
back. There was no dispute as to the 
amount due for those items and therefore 
it cannot be contended that the cashing of 
the check paying for such items constituted 
an accord and satisfaction of a dispute as 
to whether appellant had breached an agree-
ment to buy back other items it had re-
I. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Co 
operative, 11 Utah 2d 353, 35 
jected, for as stated in 1 Am.Jim, Sec. 31, 
page 231: 
"In some instances, the words, 'in 
full payment,'1 or those of a similar 
tenor, do not necessarily import or 
prove an accord, for it may be that 
there is more than one account pend-
ing between the parties, or the check 
may be qualified by concurrent trans-
actions or letters * * * ,4' 
In view of the dispute in this case as to 
the purpose of the check, the trial court 
could believe, as it did, that the sending 
and acceptance of the check was in no way 
related to anything other than payment for 
items actually bought back by appellant.1 
[2, 3] Appellant Massey Ferguson also 
contends the court erred in granting re-
spondent the amount due htm for what was 
denominated a "performance bonus," be-
cause in the written agreement a condi-
tion precedent to the entitlement for such 
bonus was that the dealer sales agreement 
be in effect on October 31st of the year "in 
which the bonus was earned, and respond-
ent Dillman had resigned his dealership be-
fore that date. We find no merit to this 
contention because respondent did not claim 
the right to the bonus under the written 
contract but under the modification of that 
contract, whereby appellant agreed to pay 
that bonus in consideration of respondent's 
voluntary termination of the sales dealer 
agreement. As this court said in Davis v. 
Payne and Day, Inc.,2 on page 57 of the 
Utah Reports, 348 P.2d on page 340, 
a * * * parties to written contracts may 
modify, waive or make new terms regard-
less of provisions in the contracts to the 
contrary * * * " 
Affirmed. G > ^ *"0 res["Uidtjrit, 
HEXRIOD, McDOXGUwH, CALLI5-
Tr.R and CROCKETT JT , concur. 
2 Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc.. 10 Utah 
2d 53, 348 P.2d 337; 12 Ain.Jur., Soc. 
427, page 1004. 
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772, § 2a(4), have the same jurisdictional 
import as Or.Laws 1979, ch. 772, § 4(4). 
The legislature has determined the limits of 
LUBA's subject matter jurisdiction. The 
statutory requirement of service on an ap-
plicant of record is jurisdictional. LUBA, 
on the other hand, is merely authorized by 
the legislature to promulgate rules govern-
ing the conduct of its proceedings, not to 
define its own jurisdiction. 
Having discussed the relation of LUBA 
rules to the statute, we turn to the question 
of whether LUBA properly applied its rule. 
LUBA concluded that Pacific Northwest 
Bell was a "party" and as such was entitled 
under its rules to be served with a copy of 
the notice of intent to appeal. LUBA fur-
ther found that Pacific Northwest Bell's 
rights were not prejudiced by failure to 
serve it. 
[4,5] A party raising the issue of a vio-
lation of LUBA rules must have been in-
jured by the alleged violation. Pacific 
Northwest Bell would be a proper party to 
allege a violation of a LUBA rule for want 
of service upon it of the notice of intent to 
appeal and to claim that LUBA lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over it.5 Petitioner Hill is 
not There is no merit, therefore, to peti-
tioner Hill's contention that a violation of 
LUBA's temporary Rules of Procedure de-
prives LUBA of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Affirmed. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
5. Service on Pacific Northwest Bell also may 
have been necessary to comply with due proc-
ess requirements. That issue, however, could 
only be raised by Pacific Northwest Bell, not by 
51 Or.App. 547 
Glen GREGORY and Ella B. Gregory, 
husband and wife, Respondents, 
v. 
Daniel L. WEBER, Appellant 
No, A7809-15373; CA 15154. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted Nov. 14, 1980. 
Decided April 6, 1981. 
Home builder appealed from judgment 
for purchasers entered by the Circuit Court, 
Multnomah County, Alan F. Davis, J., in 
purchasers' action seeking decree of specific 
performance compelling builder to convey 
title to property, and praying for damages 
for loss of use of house and for cost of 
having house completed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Warren, J., held that: (1) in view of 
fact that it was highly unlikely that defend-
ant would have memorialized in writing 
changes in original plans amounting to $945 
and left unwritten a previous agreement 
for change costing $20,000-30,000, Court 
found no reason to disturb trial court's view 
of evidence that plaintiffs had not agreed 
to pay additional $20,000-30,000 for 
changes made in original plans; (2) sketch 
of disputed remodeling changes was not 
necessary to require defendant to convey 
title, notwithstanding contention that con-
tract was too vague and indefinite, absent 
sketch, for specific performance; (3) specif-
ic performance was not inequitable merely 
because defendant had made a poor bar-
gain; (4) evidence was sufficient to support 
determination that defendant agreed to 
modifications in original plans regarding re-
modeling changes; (5) use of rental value 
was proper measure of damages for loss of 
use of house after date by which it should 
have been completed; and (6) award of 
$22,655 for cost of completion was reasona-
ble. 
Affirmed. 
petitioner Hill. Compare, Shanks v. Wash-
ington County, supra, 22 Or.App. 426 at 428, 
539 P.2d 1111. 
GREGORY v, 
Cite as, Or.App.f 
I. Appeal and Error <s» 1011.1(1) 
Where evidence is conflicting, Court of 
Appeals will defer to trial court's findings 
unless record is basis for weighing credibili-
ty differently than did trial judge. 
: • ontmcu, »175(3) 
In view of fact that it was highly un-
-. that builder would have memorialized 
- : '.:ig changes in original plans for 
home construction amounting to $945 and 
left unwritten a previous agreement for a 
change costing $20,000-30,000. Court of Ap-
peals would not disturb trial court's "u>« 
evidence that purchasers had not agrees 
pay additional $20,000 io $30,000 for 
changes made in original plans* 
3. Specific Performance *s=> 121(9) 
Sketch of disputed remodeling changes 
in house being constructed by builder was 
not necessary to require builder to convey 
title to purchasers, the only act requested to 
be specifically performed, notwithstanding 
his contention that contract was too vague 
and indefinite, absent sketch, for specific 
performance. 
4. Specific Performance <s=»16 
Specific performance of conveyance 
title to purchasers of home constructed b^  
builder was not inequitable merely because 
builder had made a i>oor bargain. 
5 Contracts ^247 
Evidence was sufficient to suppoi • 
termination that builder agreed to modi: 
cations of home he was constructing *' 
purchasers. 
6. Damages <s=»122 
Where builder commits breach of .*K-'IV 
construction contract by delay in comple-
tion and other party has been deprived o: 
use of finished product during period of 
delay, ordinary compensation for such der 
rivation is rental value of such product, 
even though use expected 'to be made of it 
was not rent of it to others and even. 
though some other use of it might ha\ e 
resulted,, in different return. 
. WEHElt Or. 393 
626 P.2d 392 
7 Damages <s=>189 
Written estimate listing items to be 
completed on purchasers' home, submitted 
by experienced builder of residences who 
inspected house twice, examined plans, and 
consulted with subcontractors, was suffi-
cient to establish damages with "reasonable 
certainty" for second builder's failure to 
complete home. 
See pubi.;cau< m; t-'nrases 
for otr.?r *ud'c*u. .« uctions and 
definitions. 
S. Damages <3=»140 
Award of $22,655 for cost completion of 
.erne builder had failed to complete under 
iorne construction contract was reasonable 
where house, for which purchasers original-
ly agreed to pay $65,000, was 80 to 85% 
completed, purchasers only asked for $25,-
000 rather than full amount of estimate of 
expert witness in order to allow offsets for 
certain items they had agreed to pay, and 
trial court deducted from that figure $1,400 
for a deck and $945 for change order agree-
ment 
9. Appeal and Error <s»205 
Home builder's failure to make offer of 
•*rr*>f when trial court ruled,,, that builder's 
rt, an appraiser, was not qualified to 
1
 ^ *« ovnert as to cost of completion 
e was not shown to be a 
r made h impossible for Court of 
*.o determine whether builder was 
1 d by exclusion of expert's testimo-
/. r 'Qrchasers' action for damages. 
.-aKin, Portland, argued the 
:eu the briefs for appellant. 
Roivt A Bennett, Portland, argued the 
cause Tor respondents. With him on the 
brief .<ere "An-, n Reynolds and Willner, 
Sennat. 3* • ;».:: ^ Hartman, Portland. 
and WARREN. JJ 
J., and WARDEN 
WARREN Judge. 
<ia; • appeals from a judgment for 
piamuifs after trial to the court in an ac-
tion for specific performance of certain 
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terms of a home construction contract and 
for damages. Plaintiffs sought a decree 
compelling defendant, a builder, to convey 
title to the property1 and also prayed for 
damages for loss of use of the house and for 
the cost of having the house completed. 
The trial court awarded specific perform-
ance as requested and entered a judgment 
for the claimed damages.2 Defendant as-
signs error to (1) the trial court's decreeing 
specific performance but not ordering de-
fendant to complete the building; (2) the 
finding that defendant was responsible for 
delays he claimed were beyond his control; 
(3) the improper use of rental value as a 
measure of loss of use; and (4) the court's 
reliance on testimony by plaintiffs' expert 
and the exclusion of testimony by defend-
ant's expert concerning costs of completion. 
We affirm. 
The original contract to construct the 
home, executed in March, 1977, provided for 
plaintiffs to pay $65,000. Defendant's posi-
tion in a nutshell is that plaintiffs agreed in 
a telephone conversation in April, 1977, to 
pay him $20,000-30,000 for certain changes 
in the original plans, which consisted of 
switching the location of the kitchen and 
living/dining rooms, and in the process de-
leting a patio and adding a pantry; adding 
a walk-in closet in the master bedroom; 
extending the garage two feet; and adding 
a fourth bedroom. Plaintiffs contend that 
most of these changes were agreed upon 
either in March, 1977, when the contract 
was signed, or in October, 1977, when a 
change order agreement for $945 was made 
covering finishing of a fourth bedroom and 
other work. 
1. In this transaction, the builder had title to the 
property until the building was completed. 
2. The judgment order provides in relevant part: 
441. Defendant shall forthwith relinquish 
possession to Plaintiffs of the real property 
described as Lot 19, PORTNOMAH PARK, 
Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon and he 
shall convey his interest therein to Plaintiffs by 
good and sufficient deed. Plaintiffs shall as-
sume the mortgage executed by Defendant in 
favor of Far West Federal Savings and Loan 
Association and the parties shall execute what-
ever documents are reasonably required to con-
clude the escrow now pending with Title Insur-
ance Company. 
The trial judge stated his reasons for 
finding for plaintiffs: 
UTHE COURT: I may make some mis-
takes. I have done my best to try to 
figure out these various problems. First 
I'm going to grant the specific perform-
ance. 
"I do it for about four different rea-
sons, Mr. Weber. You may think that 
you are an experienced contractor, but I 
think you are extremely inexperienced in 
this job. I can't accept the testimony 
that the Gregorys agreed to pay an addi-
tional 20- to $30,000. You had the 
second plans about April the 27th or 28th. 
It was obvious with 8- or 900 square feet 
in addition that you would have prepared 
a subsequent agreement for that sum of 
money, 20- to $30,000. 
"I think you acquiesced in it. First if 
you're going to need 20- or $30,000 more, 
certainly you would have borrowed that 
from Far West instead of leaving it at 
$52,000. I am sure you weren't financial-
ly capable of picking up a 20- to $30,000 
loss. 
"Secondly, you indicated * * * that you 
just didn't have time to prepare changes 
or addendums, but yet Exhibit 7 shows 
you wrote out an addendum for only 
$945, and yet you want the Court to 
believe that you—Gregorys had agreed to 
pay you 20- to $30,000. I can't accept 
that." 
Defendant seeks to overturn the decree 
of specific performance for a number of 
reasons, none of which we find persuasive. 
"2. Plaintiffs shall have judgment against 
Defendant in the amount of $11,100.00 for loss 
of use of the residence from January 1, 1978 to 
July 15, 1979, based upon a reasonable rental 
value of $600.00 per month. 
"3. Plaintiffs shall have a further judgment 
against Defendant in the sum of $22,655.00, 
which sum represents the reasonable cost to 
Plaintiffs to complete the residence after taking 
into consideration all sums which Plaintiffs 
owe to Defendant for costs incurred in excess 
of the contract allowances and for the sum 
owing under the change order agreement of 
October 3, 1977." 
GREGORY v 
Cite as, Or.App., 
Defendant contends that the usual weight 
should not be given to the trial court's 
determination as to credibility, since one of 
the plaintiffs, Mr. Gregory, did not testify 
in person on the key issues. Not only did 
defendant have Mr. Gregory testify briefly 
at trial, but the trial judge stated for the 
record that there was an "understanding" 
that due to plaintiffs bad health, his depo-
sition would be used. Had defendant in-
tended to challenge Mr. Gregory's credibili-
ty, he need not have entered into the stipu-
lation. Additionally, as can be seen from 
the trial judge's comments quoted above, 
the credibility question was resolved 
against defendant on his own testimony. 
[1,2] Defendant contends the evidence 
supports his position that the Gregorys had 
agreed to pay an additional $20,000-30,000 
for the changes made in the original plans. 
Where the evidence is conflicting, this court 
will defer to the trial court's findings unless 
the record gives a basis for weighing credi-
bility differently than did the trial judge. 
Stoll v. Curl 275 Or. 487, 490, 551 P.2d 1058 
(1976). We agree with the trial court that 
it is highly unlikely that defendant would 
have memorialized in writing changes 
amounting to $945 and left unwritten a 
previous agreement for a change costing 
$20,000-30,000. We find no reason to dis-
turb the trial court's view of the evidence. 
[3-5] Defendant also contends that the 
contract was too vague and indefinite for 
specific performance since a sketch of the 
disputed remodelling changes was not pro-
duced by plaintiffs at trial. The sketch was 
not necessary to require defendant to con-
vey title, the only act requested to be spe-
cifically performed. Defendant claims that 
specific performance is inequitable, because 
3. We are persuaded, for example, that refer-
ence to the pantry was made in the second set 
of plans to which defendant agreed; the pantry 
did not exist in the first set of plans, but was 
created by deleting the patio. In addition, we 
find convincing the explanation that the fourth 
bedroom was merely unused space which the 
architect designated on the plans as a bedroom, 
and that the bedroom was created when the 
parties agreed that the room be finished in the 
October, 1977, change order agreement 
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the original consideration for construction 
was grossly inadequate to cover the addi-
tional changes. Not only were the changes 
not quite as substantial as defendant would 
have us believe,3 but defendant cannot pre-
vail merely because he made a poor bar-
gain. We agree with the trial court that 
defendant agreed to the modifications. 
Finally, defendant seems to be requesting 
the court to allow or require him to com-
plete the construction. Plaintiffs did not 
pray for that relief, and defendant did not, 
either in his pleadings or at trial, request to 
complete the house. The trial court re-
marked at the close of trial that he gath-
ered neither party wanted defendant to 
complete construction. There is no indica-
tion in the record that defendant then 
sought to be allowed to complete the con-
struction himself. We do not interpret de-
fendant's estimate of costs of completion to 
be an offer to do the work.4 We conclude 
the decree of specific performance was not 
in error. 
[6] With regard to delays in construc-
tion, we concur with the trial court's conclu-
sion that, even granting defendant four 
months' credit for unavoidable delays, as 
the trial court did, the building should have 
been completed by January, 1978. Defend-
ant asserts that plaintiffs limited their 
claim by their allegation in the complaint 
that the building was not completed by the 
agreed-upon time in August, 1977. But de-
fendant never completed the building, and 
plaintiffs prayed for damages for loss of 
use up to the date of judgment. The only 
question is the proper measure of damages 
for plaintiffs' loss of use of the residential 
building. Without citation of any authori-
4. Defendant testified as follows concerning his 
assessment of the total cost of building the 
house: 
"Q Does that also include any costs of com-
pletion? 
"A Yes, it does. 
"Q Approximately what is that, or if you 
have the figure, I missed. 
"A Um, I would say it would be estimated 
in the neighborhood of about $3,000, but I do 
have all of the materials to do the job." 
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ty, defendant contends that plaintiffs' actu-
al expenditure for alternative housing 
should be the measure of damages. Plain-
tiffs' actual housing costs bear no logical 
relationship to the value of the premises 
had they been timely completed. They 
could have elected to live in a bungalow or 
a mansion, but that does not bear on the 
value of the lost use. The most convenient 
index of the value of loss of use in this 
situation is rental value, despite plaintiffs' 
intention to reside in the house. We are in 
accord with the following comment, from 
the Restatement regarding damages for 
breach of a construction contract: 
"Where the builder commits a breach 
by delay in completion and the other par-
ty has been deprived of the use of the 
finished product during the period of de-
lay, the ordinary compensation for such 
deprivation is the rental value of that 
product. This is the case even though the 
use expected to be made of it was not the 
rent of it to others, and even though 
some other use of it might have resulted 
in a different return. If the builder had 
reason to foresee that the product would 
be put to a special use and that an excep-
tional return would be made, the present 
Subsection does not deny the other party 
compensation measured by that excep-
tional return; he can get judgment for 
the amount thereof if he can comply with 
the rule as to certainty of proof." (Em-
phasis added.) Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 346UXb)f comment c (1932). 
The trial court used a proper measure of 
damages. 
[7,8] Defendant challenges as deficient 
plaintiffs' expert's testimony on costs of 
completion. This estimate was made by an 
experienced builder of residences who in-
spected the house twice, examined the 
plans, consulted with subcontractors, and 
submitted a written estimate listing items 
to be completed. This estimate was suffi-
cient to establish damages with "reasonable 
certainty." See Stuhblefield v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 163 Or. 432, 447, 96 P.2d 
774, 98 P.2d 14 (1940). There is no evidence 
showing this estimate to be inconsistent 
with defendant's own estimate, supra, n. 4. 
• At trial, plaintiffs only asked for $25,000 
for cost of completion rather than the full 
amount of the estimate, in order to allow 
offsets for certain items which plaintiffs 
had agreed to pay. From that figure, the 
trial court deducted $1400 for a deck and 
$945 for the change order agreement of 
October, 1977, to arrive at the final figure 
of $22,655. Defendant's own expert testi-
fied the house was actually worth over 
$135,000; and plaintiffs testified the house 
was 80-85% completed. We find the trial 
court's award reasonable. 
[9] Defendant contends the trial court 
should have allowed his expert, an apprais-
er, to testify as to the cost of completion of 
the building. Defendant made no offer of 
proof. The trial court ruled that the expert 
was not qualified as an expert since he was 
not shown to be a contractor. We do not 
pass on that ruling, for we are of the view 
that defendant's failure to make an offer of 
proof makes it impossible for us to deter-
mine whether defendant was prejudiced by 
the exclusion of his expert's testimony. 
Moore Mill & Lbr. Co. v. Foster, 216 Or. 
204, 255, 336 P.2d 39, 337 P.2d 810 (1959); 
see also Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz, 262 Or. 293, 
312, 498 P.2d 766 (1972) (in order to claim 
prejudicial error in court's refusal to allow 
production of an exhibit, defendants had 
the obligation to make the sought-after ma-
terial part of the record). 
Affirmed. 
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suming it be held that Bras well Motor 
Freight Lines is the same as Bras well Mo-
tor Freight Lines, Inc.) have no interest 
in the check, then the endorsement of the 
named payee is valid. There can be no 
question but what Wertz never intended 
Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., to have 
any interest in the checks sent to Kendall. 
If under (c) above the agent of the appel-
lant, to wit, its assistant comptroller, sup-
plied Kendall with the name of a payee, 
intending that the named payee have no in-
terest in the funds, then the endorsement 
on the check would be valid and would 
relieve the defendant bank from liability. 
There can be no question that Wertz fur-
nished the name of the payee to Kendall 
or that Wertz intended for the funds repre-
sented by the checks to go to himself and 
Kendall and not to the appellant herein. 
There is no suggestion that the bank 
knew of any fraudulent scheme or acted 
in bad faith in its dealings with the de-
positor Kendall. As to the meaning of the 
term "bad faith" see Sugarhouse Finance 
Company v. Zions First National Bank, 21 
Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968). 
[1,2] When an agent of a drawer of a 
check supplies the name of a payee which 
he intends to have no interest therein, the 
check is deemed to be payable to bearer, 
and an endorsement of the payee's name on 
the check is not forgery. Any loss arising 
from such transaction must fall upon the 
drawer who employed the dishonest signing 
agent.1 It is thus obvious that no liability 
attaches to the defendant bank for accept-
ing the deposits made by Kendall or in dis-
bursing the funds thereof on the checks he 
wrote. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs are awarded to the respond-
ent. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
TUCKETT and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
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PLC LANDSCAPE CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PICCADILLY FISH 'N CHIPS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12607. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 27, 1972. 
Action by landscaper seeking to re-
cover balance allegedly due. The Second 
District Court, Weber County, John F. 
Wahlquist, J., entered judgment for land-
scaper, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, J., held that evi-
dence supported finding that plaintiff land-
scaper was entitled to recover balance of 
$1,169.53 for landscaping premises of de-
fendant's newly established cafe. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, J., concurred in result. 
1. Contracts <®=236 
Except where a change, modification 
or addition to a contract may conflict with 
the rule against varying a written contract 
by parol, there is nothing so sacrosanct 
about having entered into one agreement 
that it will prevent the parties from enter-
ing into any such change, modification, ex-
tension or addition to their agreement for 
doing business with each other that they 
may mutually agree upon. 
2. Contracts <§^236, 247 
Subsequent agreements between parties 
to a contract which amount to a change, 
modification, extension or addition to their 
contract are governed by the same rules as 
to proof and enforceability as the original 
contract. 
3. Appeal and Error <£=1035 
Fact that plaintiff's complaint involves 
an account stated for labor and materials, 
while court allows recovery on the basis 
of quantum meruit, does not present preju-
I. Bailey, The Law of Bank Checks (4th Ed.), § 1524, p. 523. 
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dicial error so long as defendant was not 
disadvantaged by being denied a fair op-
portunity to meet the change in the theory 
of recovery. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 54(c) (1). 
4. Contracts @=>350(l) 
Evidence supported finding that plain-
tiff landscaper was entitled to recover bal-
ance of SI,169.53 for landscaping premises 
of defendant's newly established cafe. 
Strong, Poelman & Fox, Harold A. 
Hintze, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Ogden, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiff sued to recover a balance of $1,-
169.53 for landscaping the premises of de-
fendant's newly established cafe at 1418 
Wall Avenue in Ogden. After the plain-
tiff had presented its evidence, the defend-
ant challenged its sufficiency by a motion 
to dismiss. The court took the matter un-
der advisement and thereafter made a 
memorandum decision, and made findings 
(as permitted by Rule 41(b), U.R.CP.) 
and entered judgment against the defendant 
for the amount sued for. 
The negotiations between the parties 
were oral concerning the landscaping which 
plaintiff first estimated at about $7400. 
However, in their discussions, due to elimi-
nation of some items, and the fact that 
some of the work would be done by the de-
fendant, the parties arrived at a figure of 
about $4600. As the work progressed, be-
cause problems arose, including the fact 
that the defendant was unable to participate 
to the extent they had contemplated, the 
cost was increased to what the plaintiff 
contends was reasonably worth $6,669,53 
!
- See Davis v. Payne and Day, 10 Utah 2d 
53, 348 P.2d 337. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 
t'tah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86. 
* Taylor v. E. M. Royle, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 
P«2d 279; Morriss v. Russell, 120 Utah 
545, 236 P.2d 451; and see Rule 54(c) 
for all labor and material it had furnished. 
Of this the defendant paid $5,500, but 
refused to pay the balance which is the 
subject of this suit. 
The contentions of the defendant are (1) 
that the plaintiff should be bound by the 
original amount agreed upon and that the 
court erred in allowing the plaintiff to re-
cover upon quantum meruit rather than 
upon its pleaded express contract, and (2) 
that the evidence failed to prove the value 
of the material and labor to be worth the 
$6,669.53 as found by the trial court. 
[1,2] As to (1) above: Except where 
a change, modification or addition to a 
contract may conflict with the well-recog-
nized rule against varying a written con-
tract by parol, there is nothing so sacro-
sanct about having entered into one agree-
ment that it will prevent the parties enter-
ing into any such change, modification, 
extension or addition to their arrangement 
for doing business with each other that they 
may mutually agree.1 That is what ap-
pears to have happened here and such sub-
sequent agreements are governed by the 
same rules as to proof and enforceability as 
the original agreement. 
[3] Neither do we see any such preju-
dice to the defendant as would justify re-
versing the judgment because the plain-
tiff's complaint was an account stated for 
labor and materials, which defendant urges 
should be characterized as on express con-
tract, whereas the court allowed recovery 
on the basis of quantum meruit. We have 
heretofore held that such a variance is not 
prejudicial error so long as the defendant 
was not disadvantaged by being denied a 
fair opportunity to meet the change in 
theory of recovery.2 
As to defendant's contention (2) above, 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence: 
defendant's argument amounts to the plac-
(1), which provides in part: 
every final judgment shall grant the re-
lief to which the party . . . is en-
titled, even if the party has not demand-
ed such relief in his pleadings . . . 
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ing its own interpretation upon and criti-
cism of the plaintiffs evidence, undoubted-
ly and perhaps understandably colored by 
defendant's desire as to the result. But this 
court cannot properly indulge any such 
favor to the defendant's position, but view 
it in accord with the findings of the trial 
court. 
[4] In regard to the addition of cer-
tain substantial items to the project, Mr. 
Dale R. Cook for the plaintiff stated that 
the defendant's agent: ". . . would 
say, well we have got to get it done, so you 
guys go ahead and we will work this out 
later." Plaintiff's evidence also was to the 
effect that the defendant did not do some 
of the labor as agreed, for which the plain-
tiff had to restore charges; and that the 
value of all of the labor and materials was 
the $6669.53, for which the defendant was 
billed. The trial court, whose prerogative 
it is to find the facts, having found accord-
ingly, there is no basis upon which to upset 
the judgment.3 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respond-
ent). 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT and 
ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM. 
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Jaylyn EATON, a minor, by and through her 
guardian ad litem, Jay H. Eaton, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Leon H. SAVAGE and Paula Savage, his 
wife, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 12814. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 30, 1972. 
Action against landlords for injuries 
sustained by tenant's babysitter who fell 
3. See Glazier & Sons, Inc. v. La 
over pipe railing at edge of sidewalk. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
James S. Sawaya, J., granted summary 
judgment to landlords and appeal was tak-
en. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held 
that landlords who installed pipe railing 
approximately 15 inches above ground at 
edge of sidewalk to impede foot traffic 
across lawns were not expected to foresee 
that tenant's 13-year-old babysitter might 
be injured in fall over railing while assist-
ing child to walk on the railing. 
Affirmed. 
i. Landlord and Tenant <§=» 165(1) 
Landlords who installed pipe railing 
approximately 15 inches above ground at 
edge of sidewalk to impede foot traffic 
across lawns were not expected to foresee 
that tenant's 13-year-old babysitter might 
be injured in fall over railing while as-
sisting child to walk on the railing. 
2. Negligence <§=>33(3) 
Possessor of land is liable to a tres-
passing child only if he fails to meet the 
standard of care expected of a reasonably 
prudent man under the circumstances. 
3. Negligence «S=>121 (2) 
Fact that an unfortunate accident oc-
curred upon premises of defendants which 
resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff 
is insufficient to establish liability on the 
part of defendants. 
Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
F. Robert Bayle and Wallace R. Lauch-
nor, of Bayle & Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
In this matter plaintiff appeals from an 
adverse summary judgment granted in ia-
vor of the defendants in the court below. 
The plaintiff seeks to recover for personal 
injuries on the premises of the defendants 
who are the owners of apartment build-
sn, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226. 
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modified must be deemed waived or ex-
cused. John M. RAPP, dba Rapp Construction 
Company, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a Colorado 
corporation, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16248. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 1, 1980. 
Building contractor brought an action 
against building owner to recover extra ex-
penses in performing construction contract 
caused by delay in delivery of air-handling 
unit ordered by the building owner, and the 
building owner counterclaimed for its own 
expenses resulting from the delay. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G. 
Hal Taylor, J., dismissed both claims for 
recovery due to the delay and ordered the 
building owner to reimburse the contractor 
for the cost of a temporary partition direct-
ed by the contractor at the order of the 
owner in the uncompleted building during 
the delay to protect telephone equipment 
which had been installed, and contractor 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
held that: (1) the contractor assumed the 
risk of loss from delay in delivery of the 
air-handling unit; (2) delay in the delivery 
of the air-handling unit excused the con-
tractor's obligation to timely complete the 
project; and (3) the trial court's order that 
the owner recompense the contractor for 
the costs involved in directing the tempo-
rary partition was proper. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts ®=>236, 246 
Parties to contract may, by mutual con-
sent, alter all or any portion of contract by 
agreeing upon modification thereof, and 
where such modification is agreed upon, 
terms of modification govern rights and 
obligations of parties under contract, and 
any premodification contractual rights 
which conflict with terms of contract as 
2. Contracts <s=> 303(5) 
Any breach of construction contract by 
either building owner or contractor arising 
in connection with air-handling unit or in 
connection with substituted unit was ex-
cused by further modification of contract 
specifying second substituted unit. 
3. Contracts <s=> 299(2) 
Where both building owner and con-
tractor agreed to modify construction con-
tract to use different air-handling unit than 
originally called for with full knowledge 
that delivery of unit might be delayed, con-
tractor assumed risk of loss from possible 
delay and could not recover from building 
owner extra expenses in performing con-
tract caused by the delay. 
4. Contracts <s=>300(l) 
Where building owner and contractor 
agreed to modify construction contract to 
use different air handling unit than origi-
nally called for with full knowledge by both 
parties that delivery of unit might be de-
layed, contractor's obligation under contract 
to make timely completion of project be-
came, by the modification, conditional upon 
timely arrival of unit to be installed, and 
failure of that condition excused contrac-
tor's obligation to timely complete project. 
5. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
<s=>30 
Where work is ordered for benefit of 
building owner, or to avoid injury not occa-
sioned by breach of building contractor, 
such work must, in equity, be recompensed 
to avoid unjust enrichment. 
6. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
s=>30 
Contractor was entitled to reimburse-
ment from building owner for costs of 
erecting temporary partition in uncomplet-
ed building to protect owner's equipment 
which had been installed, where delay in 
completing construction of building was not 
caused by contractor's breach. 
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Bryce E. Roe of Roe & Fowler, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
David S. Dolowitz of Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer, Kenneth R. Madsen, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
This appeal comes from the dismissal of 
an action by John M. Rapp, doing business 
as Rapp Construction Co. (hereafter plain-
tiff) against Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co. (hereafter defendant) for 
damages due to breach of a construction 
agreement, and is accompanied by a cross-
appeal of the dismissal of defendant's coun-
terclaim alleging breach of contract by 
plaintiff. 
Defendant, a Colorado corporation func-
tioning as a public utility in numerous west-
ern states, made public announcement on 
March 2, 1974, that it was soliciting bids on 
a construction contract for the erection of a 
telephone building in Green River, Wyo-
ming. Plaintiff, a duly licensed Utah con-
tractor, requested and received the plans 
and related contract documents from de-
fendant. 
The provisions of these documents, where 
relevant here, called upon prospective bid-
ders to examine the plans carefully, famil-
iarize themselves with the requirements 
and circumstances thereof, base any bid 
submitted upon strict adherence to the 
terms and specifications set forth in the 
contract documents. Furthermore, bidders 
were to request any clarification or substi-
tution in the plans or terms of the agree-
ment prior to making a bid, and recognize 
that a bid submission constituted an accept-
ance of the specifications given as sufficient 
to allow the bidder to satisfactorily com-
plete the project in conformity therewith. 
The general conditions of the contract also 
stated that any information prepared for 
the defendant by independent sources, and 
included in the specifications, was not war-
1. Defendant implies, on appeal, that plaintiffs 
inability to take a 25 week delivery of the 
Carner unit and still complete the job on time 
was due to unnecessary delay in placing the 
order The parties' subsequent agreement (dis-
cussed supra) renders this point irrelevant, but 
ranted by the defendant, and that bidders 
relied thereon at their own risk. The terms 
of the offered contract set the deadline for 
completion at October 1,1974, time being of 
the essence due to the anticipated delivery 
and installation of sensitive telephone 
equipment. 
Plaintiff solicited numerous bids from 
subcontractors in the preparation of his 
own bid on the project, among them a bid 
from Star Plumbing and Heating Company 
of Salt Lake City for air circulation equip-
ment and duct work. Plaintiff then sub-
mitted his bid to defendant, and on March 
29, 1974, received word that he was low 
bidder. A formal contract was agreed upon 
shortly thereafter. 
The plans submitted to plaintiff, consist-
ing both of architectural drawings and me-
chanical drawings, called for the installa-
tion of a Carrier air handling unit. C & H 
Sheet Metal, supplier of Star Plumbing and 
Heating's air handling equipment, made in-
quiry into the availability of such a unit, 
and learned that delivery to the construc-
tion site would take 25 weeks, making it 
impossible for plaintiff to meet the October 
1 deadline specified in the construction 
agreement.1 Plaintiff contacted defend-
ant's architect, Gerald Deines and Associ-
ates, and informed them of the problem. 
Upon consultation with defendant's me-
chanical engineer, the architect approved a 
suggested substitute, a McQuay model 164 
air handling unit. The change, together 
with an alteration in the contract price to 
reflect the more expensive unit, was embod-
ied in a written change order, submitted by 
plaintiff and signed by both parties. 
Early in August, plaintiff inquired of de-
fendant's mechanical engineer regarding 
the proper size for a hole which would have 
to be left in the wall of the room designed 
to house the air handling system, in order to 
it would appear that, even if plaintiff had or-
dered the unit the day following his notification 
of contract with defendant, 25 weeks would 
have put delivery close enough to the specified 
deadline to create substantial difficulty in fin-
ishing on time 
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install the unit. Upon rechecking the me-
chanical drawings which he had prepared 
(and upon which plaintiff had been relying), 
the engineer discovered that he had omitted 
certain ceiling beams, which extended 2IV2 
inches down into the room in question. The 
parties reached the conclusion that, in light 
of this neglected space limitation, the 164 
unit formerly agreed upon would be too 
large, and a further substitution, "of a unit 
having less expansive dimensions, would 
have to be made.2 Plaintiff, by letter, au-
thorized defendant to negotiate directly 
with C & H Sheet Metal regarding the 
selection of a substitute. Defendant, how-
ever, made no such contact, but unilaterally 
selected the McQuay model 150 air handling 
unit, and pursued arrangements for its de-
livery. McQuay, wrhich had committed to a 
delivery date of September 13, 1974, for the 
164 unit stated that it would try to honor 
that commitment with the substitute 150 
unit, but expressly refused to guarantee 
delivery on time. Nonetheless, defendant 
issued, and plaintiff signed, a change order 
reflecting the switch to the 150 unit, to-
gether with price alterations in the contract 
agreement. 
Delivery of the air handling unit to the 
job site was drastically delayed, coming on 
November 29, 1974. Although plaintiff had 
experienced, during the summer, some diffi-
culty in keeping up with the projected 
schedule for the job, the delay in delivery of 
the unit ground the operation to a standstill 
for over two months, costing both parties 
substantial amounts by way of various de-
lay expenses, and preventing ultimate com-
pletion of the building until May 1, 1975. 
During the delay, defendant ordered plain-
tiff to erect a temporary partition in the 
uncompleted building to protect the tele-
phone equipment which had been installed. 
2. Some dispute remains between the parties 
regarding the necessity of this second substitu-
tion, defendant maintaining that the 164 unit 
would have fit into the room, plaintiff produc-
ing letters indicating that it was defendant who 
made the decision that the larger unit was 
unacceptable. In light of the subsequent agree-
ment between the parties, the viability of in-
stalling the 164 unit is irrelevant to our consid-
eration. 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover expenses 
occasioned by the delay in delivery of the 
air handling unit, together with the cost of 
the partition installed at defendant's di-
rection. Defendant counterclaimed for its 
own expenses resulting from the delay. 
Following a trial to the court sitting with-
out a jury, both claims for recovery due to 
delay were dismissed, but defendant was 
ordered to reimburse plaintiff for the cost 
of the partition. 
Plaintiff seeks recovery of losses due to 
the delay, on the theory that the defendant 
breached an implied warranty by issuing 
bids on a contract, the particulars of which 
were impossible to complete within the 
specified time; defendant denies the exist-
ence of such a warranty, asks that the 
ruling dealing with the partition be re-
versed, and that plaintiff recompense de-
fendant for its own losses due to the belat-
ed delivery. In support of their respective 
theories of recovery, both parties cite acts 
and omissions dating all the way back to 
March 2, 1974. Curiously, neither party, 
pursuant to this appeal, addressed itself to 
the impact upon their claims of the two 
change orders signed by the parties during 
the course of their dealings. 
[1] It is well-settled law that the parties 
to a contract may, by mutual consent, alter 
all or any portion of that contract by agree-
ing upon a modification thereof.8 Where 
such a modification is agreed upon, the 
terms thereof govern the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties under the contract, and 
any pre-modification contractual rights 
which conflict with the terms of the con-
tract as modified must be deemed waived or 
excused.4 Where a party's expectations un-
der a contract are frustrated, he may seek 
3. PLC Landscape Construction v. Piccadilly 
Fish'n Chips, Inc.. 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 
(1972); Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 
Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962); Davis v. 
Payne and Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 
337 (1960). 
4. Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., cited supra; 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963). 
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recovery from the other party only if his 
injury is the direct result of a breach of the 
contract as modified.5 
[2] Article 13 of the "general condi-
tions" section of the contract here under 
consideration sets forth the specific means 
whereby changes in the contractual agree-
ment should come about. The article ex-
pressly grants the right to make changes in 
the materials used, time required, contract 
price, and other terms of the agreement. 
The procedure adopted for this process is 
that of the signing, by both parties, of a 
written change order. This procedure was 
adopted by both parties on two separate 
occasions. The first change order, substi-
tuting the McQuay 164 unit for the Carrier 
unit originally intended, was voluntarily 
agreed to and signed by both parties upon 
learning that the Carrier unit would not 
arrive in time to complete the contract on 
schedule. The second change order, substi-
tuting the 150 for the 164 unit, was agreed 
to and signed by the parties after they 
learned that the 164 unit was prohibitively 
large to be used to the satisfaction of both 
parties. This being the case, the change 
orders constituted valid modifications of the 
existing contract. Breach of the contract, 
to the extent that it occurred at all, may 
not now be assigned to acts or omissions 
excused by such modifications. Thus, de-
fendant may or may not have been in 
breach for prescribing the use of the Carri-
er unit (or plaintiff might or might not 
have been in breach for failing to make a 
timely order thereof), but the modification 
settling upon the substitute McQuay 164 
unit excused both performances. Similarly, 
defendant may or may not have been in 
breach by prescribing a unit too large for 
5. That injury must proceed causally trom a 
breach of the agreed terms of the contract, see 
Sprague v Boyles Bros Drilling Co, 4 Utah 2d 
344, 294 P2d 689 (1956) 
6. We express no opinion regarding plaintiffs 
theory ot warranty 
7. A letter from plaintiff to Gerald Deines and 
Associates, dated August 1, 1974, indicates that 
on that date (well in advance of the day upon 
which plaintiff signed the change order approv-
ing the 150 unit), plaintiff was well aware of 
the room that had been designed to house 
it, but that performance was excused by the 
further modifications specifying a smaller 
unit. 
Our only concern, then, is whether either 
party breached the contract by failing to 
perform according to its terms as modified. 
Plaintiff maintains that defendant, by is-
suing contract documents to prospective 
bidders, impliedly warranted their feasibili-
ty. Since timely completion was impossible,
 s 
asserts plaintiff, defendant is in breach of 
that warranty. We cannot agree with this 
assertion. 
[3] Since the only injury suffered by 
plaintiff under the contract as modified was 
incident to the delayed delivery of the 
McQuay 150 unit, a breach of warranty, if 
any, must be found in the delayed delivery 
of that unit. Without reaching the ques-
tion of whether or not defendant made any 
warranty by release of concract documents,6 
we observe that any warranty which could 
have been made was amply disclaimed by 
defendant's notice to plaintiff that delivery 
of the 150 unit might be delayed.7 Since 
both parties agreed upon the use of the 150 
unit, with full awareness that delivery 
thereof might be delayed, plaintiff must be 
said to have assumed the risk of any loss 
which he might incur by reason of such 
possible delay, and may not now be heard to 
seek recovery therefor.8 
[4] This mutual awareness of the possi-
bility of delay in delivery of the 150 unit 
likewise disposes of defendant's counter-
claim. Again, any claim of compensable 
breach of contract raised by defendant 
must necessarily be one of the terms of the 
contract as modified.9 By agreeing to the 
the risk of delayed delivery of the proposed 
unit 
8. 18 Wilhston on Contracts § 1933, p 16, 6 
Corbm on Contracts § 1333 
9. Defendants point out that, long before the 
difficulties concerning the dehverv of the 150 
unit arose, plaintiff was badlv behind in his 
progress reports This matter is of no concern 
under the circumstances As defendants make 
no claim of express anticipatory repudiation or 
REDDING 
Cite as, Utah, 
use of an air circulating unit which, as 
defendant well knew, might not arrive in 
time to permit timely completion of the 
project under the terms of the original 
agreement, defendant created what must 
be regarded as a condition precedent im-
plied in fact. Plaintiff's obligation to make 
timely completion of the project, which had 
before been absolute, became, by the modi-
fication of the contract, conditional upon 
the timely arrival of the unit to be installed. 
Failure of that condition excused plaintiffs 
obligation to make timely completion of the 
project.10 As such, no liability arises. 
[5,6] Finally, with regard to the trial 
court's order that defendant recompense 
plaintiff for the costs involved in erecting 
the temporary partition, we note that, 
where work is ordered for the benefit of a 
building owner, or to avoid injury not occa-
sioned by the breach of the building con-
tractor, such work must, in equity, be rec-
ompensed to avoid unjust enrichment.11 
Defendant having received the benefit of 
plaintiff's work in the present case, recov-
ery of the reasonable value thereof is war-
ranted. 
The decision of the trial court is hereby 
affirmed. No costs awarded. 
v. BRADY 
606 P^d 1193 
Utah H93 
John H. REDDING, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Rodney H. BRADY, President of Weber 
State College et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 16282. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1980. 
Editor of student newspaper at a state 
college brought an action to compel defend-
ants to make available to him the names of 
employees of the college and the gross sala-
ries paid to them. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
granted the editor's motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and the defendants appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., 
held that the editor was entitled to the 
information as requested. 
Affirmed. 
Wilkins and Stewart, JJ., concurred in 
result. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
rw (o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
voluntary disablement on the part of the plain-
tiff, no breach of contract regarding timely 
completion could occur in advance of the date 
set for completion of the project, by which 
date, further complications had rendered such 
performance non-obligatory. 
I. Constitutional Law <a=»82(7) 
Scope of right of privacy is determined 
by applying commonly accepted standards 
of social propriety, and includes those as-
pects of individual's activities and manner 
of living that would generally be regarded 
as being of such personal and private na-
ture as to belong to himself and to be of no 
proper concern to others, and extends to 
protecting against intrusion into or expo-
sure of not only things which might result 
in actual harm and damage, but also to 
things which might result in shame or hu-
miliation, or merely violate one's pride in 
keeping his private affairs to himself. 
10. See Creer v. Thurman, Utah, 581 P.2d 149 
(1978) 
II. See 12 Wilhston on Contracts § 1459A, p. 92 
et seq. 
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the verdict. In the absence of any abuse 
of discretion this court must and does affirm 
the trial court's determination. 
WADE, C J., and HENRIOD, CAL-
LISTER, and CROCKETT, J J., concur. 
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11 Utah 2d 289 
Marcla G. SAMMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
David ECCLES, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 9235. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
Jan. 10, 1961. 
Action by married woman for injury 
resulting from severe emotional distress 
she claimed to have suffered because de-
fendant persistently annoyed her with pro-
posals that she have illicit sexual relations 
with him. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., dis-
missed action and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that com-
plaint stated cause of action even though 
no other overt tort was complained of. 
Reversed. 
Callister and Henriod, JJ., dissented. 
1. Judgment <S=183 
A motion for summary judgment is 
in effect a demurrer to claim of plaintiff. 
2. Judgment <§=»I85(2) 
On defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiff's contentions must be 
considered in light most to her advantage 
and all doubts resolved in favor of per-
mitting her to go to trial, and only if, when 
the whole matter is so viewed, she could, 
nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, 
should motion be granted.1 
I. Morris v. Famsworth Motel, 123 Utah 
2S9, 259 P.2d 297. 
3. Damages <§=57 
Torts <£»24 
Action for severe emotional distress 
may not be based upon mere negligence 
but, even though not accompanied by bodilv 
impact or physical injury, an action may be 
based upon severe emotional distress where 
defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct towards plaintiff and defendant's 
purpose was to inflict emotional distress or 
any reasonable person would have known 
that such would result and actions are of 
such nature as to be considered outrageous 
and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standard of decency 
and morality. 
4. Constitutional Law <&»67 
It is function of courts and juries to 
determine whether claims are valid or false 
and responsibility should not be shunned 
merely because task may be difficult to per-
form. 
5. Torts <&=>! 
Under usual circumstances, solicitation 
to sexual intercourse would not be action-
able even though it may be offensive to the 
offeree. 
6. Damages €=149 
Torts €=326(1) 
Complaint, filed by married woman, 
stated cause of action against defendant on 
basis that his proposals that plaintiff have 
illicit sexual relations with him resulted 
in severe emotional distress to plaintiff.2 
Victor A. Spencer, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Sumner J. Hatch, Ray S. McCarty, Salt 
Lake City, for respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Plaintiff Marcia G. Samms sought to re-
cover damages from David Eccles for in-
jury resulting from severe emotional dis-
tress she claims to have suffered because 
he persistently annoyed her with indecent 
proposals. 
2. Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 
429. 
SAMMS v. 
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The parties presented their respective 
contentions to the court at pretrial. The 
court entered a pretrial order noting that, 
"plaintiff bases her cause of action on * * 
the infliction of severe emotional distress 
by wilful and wanton conduct of an out-
rageous and intolerable nature," and dis-
missed the action upon the ground that 
plaintiff had shown no basis upon which 
relief could be granted. She appeals. 
Plaintiff alleged that she is a respectable 
married woman; that she has never en-
couraged the defendant's attentions in any 
way but has repulsed them; that all during 
the time from May to December, 1957, the 
defendant repeatedly and persistently called 
her by phone at various hours including 
late at night, soliciting her to have illicit 
sexual relations with him; and that on one 
occasion came to her residence in connec-
tion with such a solicitation and made an 
indecent exposure of his person. She 
charges that she regarded his proposals as 
insulting, indecent and obscene; that her 
feelings were deeply wounded; and that as 
a result thereof she suffered great anxiety 
and fear for her personal safety and severe 
emotional distress for which she asks $1,500 
as actual, and a like amount as punitive, 
damages. 
[1,2] A motion for summary judgment 
is in effect a demurrer to the claims of the 
plaintiff, saying: assuming they are true, 
no right to recover is shown. It is regarded 
as a harsh measure which the courts are 
reluctant to sanction because it deprives 
the adverse party of an opportunity to pre-
sent the evidence concerning her grievance 
for adjudication. For this reason plain-
tiff's contentions must be considered in the 
light most to her advantage and all doubts 
resolved in favor of permitting her to go 
1. See Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 
Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297. 
2. For a recent general discussion of the 
history and development of such actions 
see, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suf-
fering, 25 NACCA Law Journal 116. 
3. Interstate Life & Ace. Ins. Co., •. 
Brewer. 56 Ga.App. 599, 193 S.E. 458. 
35S P .2d—22^ 
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to trial; and only if when the whole matter 
is so viewed, she could, nevertheless, estab-
lish no right to recovery, should the motion 
be granted.1 
Due to the highly subjective and volatile 
nature of emotional distress and the vari-
ability of its causations, the courts have 
historically been wary of dangers in open-
ing the door to recovery therefor. This 
is partly because such claims may easily be 
fabricated:, or as sometimes stated, are 
easy to assert and hard to defend against. 
They have, therefore, been reluctant to 
allow such a right of action unless the 
emotional distress was suffered as a result 
of some other overt tort. Nevertheless, 
recognizing the reality of such injuries and 
the injustice of permitting them to go un-
requited, in many cases courts have strained 
to find the other tort as a peg upon which 
to hang the right of recovery. 
Some of these have been unrealistic, or 
even flimsy.2 For instance, a technical 
battery was found where an insurance ad-
juster derisively tossed a coin on the bed 
of a woman who was in a hospital with a 
heart condition, and because of this tort she 
was allowed to recover for distress caused 
by his other attempts at intimidation in ac-
cusing her of gold-bricking and attempting 
to defraud his company;3 courts have also 
dealt with trespass where hotel employees 
have invaded rooms occupied by married 
couples and imputed to them immoral con-
duct ; 4 and other similar torts have been 
used as a basis for such recovery.5 But a 
realistic analysis of many of these cases 
will show that the recognized tort is but 
incidental and that the real basis of recov-
ery is the outraged feelings and emotional 
distress resulting from some aggravated 
conduct of the defendant. The lengths to 
4. Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 
N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647; DeWolf v. Ford, 
193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527, 21 L.R.A., 
N.S., 860. 
5. See Craker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 
36 Wis. 657; Talcott v. National Exhibi-
tion Co., 144 App.Div. 337, 128 N.Y.S. 
1059; Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 
2 CirM 1936, 82 F.2d 154. 
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which courts have gone to find a basis for' 
allowing such recoveries serves to empha-
size their realization that justice demands 
that grossly wrong conduct which causes 
such an injury to another should be held 
accountable. 
In recent years courts have shown an 
increasing awareness of the necessity and 
justice af forthrightly recognizing the true 
basis for allowing recovery for such wrongs 
and of getting rid of the shibboleth that 
another tort peg is necessary to that pur-
pose. Examples are: Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch,6 injuries caused 
by shock where a grocery man included a 
dead rat in a package as a joke; Savage v. 
Boies,7 distress caused by false representa-
tion that plaintiff's child had been injured 
in an automobile accident; Cohen v. Lion 
Products Co.,8 distress to plaintiff's husband 
resulted from mandatory orders and 
charges of failure made to him as an em-
ployee by defendant's officers. 
In LaSalle Extension University v. Fo-
garty,9 upon defendant's refusal to pay 
plaintiff's demand, plaintiff sent threatening 
letters to the defendant, and to his neigh-
bors and employer, for the purpose of har-
assing him into paying their claim, against 
which it ultimately proved he had a good 
defense. Recovery was allowed on his 
counterclaim for emotional distress thus 
wrongfully caused him. The court cited 
the Iowa case of Barnett v. Collection Serv-
ice Co.10 and quoted the rule which has 
come to be widely recognized that: " * * 
where thi act is willful or malicious, as 
distinguished from being merely negligent, 
that recovery may be had for mental pain, 
though no physical injury results." 
A case closely analogous to the instant 
one where such recovery was allowed is the 
recently decided one of Mitran v. William-
son.11 It holds that a complaint alleging 
that the defendant had repeatedly solicited 
6. 160 Md. 1S9, 153 A. 22. 
7. 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349. 
8. D.C.Mass. , 177 F .Supp . 486. 
9. 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424, 426, 91 
A.L.R. 1491. 
t ' plaintiff to have illicit intercourse and had 
ia~ sent obscene photographs of himself to her 
i stated a cause of action. 
s e s
 Our court has dealt with a generally 
e
*°* similar problem in the case of Jeppsen v. 
Jensen,12 upon which the plaintiff places 
considerable reliance. The defendant had 
. come into the Jeppsen home where the 
• plaintiff was weak and ill from a recent 
l childbirth. In a macabre scene the defend-
l ant used violent and abusive language and 
ir- continually threatened the plaintiff's hus-
band with a revolver which so terrified 
; the plaintiff that she "fell into a swoon or 
1  faint, and was attacked by a nervous chill, 
• * * * so that she became prostrated and 
 was again confined to her bed for the great-
*e er part of two days." The trial court grant-
ed a nonsuit. Upon appeal, Justice Frick 
reviewed some pertinent authorities and 
quoted approvingly this language from 
 Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co.:13 
"While mental suffering, unaccom-
*°" panied by injury to purse or person, 
) a v
 affords no basis for an action predi-
n £ cated upon wrongful acts, merely negli-
>n" gent, yet such damages may be recov-
a r
" ered in those cases where the plaintiff 
n s t
 had suffered at the hands of the de-
>°d fendant a wanton, voluntary, or in-
his tentional wrong the natural result of 
ms which is the causation of mental suffer-
ted
 m g a n c j wounded feelings." 
~ 
The trial court's ruling was reversed and 
j the cause remanded for a new trial because 
it could not be said as a matter of law that 
the defendant's conduct was not willful 
and wanton, 
, 
[3] Our study of the authorities, and 
m of the .arguments advanced, convinces us 
: that, conceding such a cause of action may 
 not be based upon mere negligence, the 
best considered view recognizes an action 
: for severe emotional distress, though not 
10. 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25. 
11. 21 Misc.2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 6S9. 
12. 47 Utah 536, 155 P . 429, L.R.A.1916D, 
614. 
13. 2 Ga.App. 845, 59 S.E. 189. 
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accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the plain-
tiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or, (b) where any rea-
sonable person would have known that such 
-would result; and his actions are of such 
a nature as to be considered outrageous 
and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency 
and morality.14 This test seems to be a 
more realistic safeguard against false claims 
than to insist upon finding some other at-
tendant tort, which may be of minor char-
acter, or fictional. 
[4] It is further to be observed that 
the argument against allowing such an ac-
tion because groundless charges may be 
made is not a good reason for denying re-
covery. If the right to recover for injury 
resulting from the wrongful conduct could 
be defeated whenever such dangers exist, 
many of the grievances the law deals with 
would be eliminated. That some claims 
may be spurious should not compel those 
who administer justice to shut their eyes 
to serious wrongs and let them go without 
being brought to account. It is the function 
of courts and juries to determine whether 
claims are valid or false. This responsibil-
ity should not be shunned merely because 
the task may be difficult to perform. 
[5] We quite agree with the idea that 
under usual circumstances the solicitation 
to sexual intercourse would not be action-
able even though it may be offensive to the 
offeree. It seems to be a custom of long 
standing and- one which in all likelihood 
will continue. The assumption is usually 
indulged that most solicitations occur under 
such conditions as to fall within the well-
known phrase of Chief Judge Magruder 
that, "there is no harm in asking/ ' 1 5 The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Reed v. 
14. See See. 46, 1948 Supplement to the 
Restatement of Torts. 
15. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Dis-
turbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1033, 1055. 
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Maley pertinently observed that an action 
will not lie in favor of a woman against a 
man who, without trespass or assault, makes 
such a request; and that the reverse is also 
t rue: that a man would have no right of 
action against a woman for such a solicita-
tion.16 
[6] But the situations just described, 
where tolerance for the conduct referred 
to is indulged, are clearly distinguishable 
from the aggravated circumstances the 
plaintiff claims existed here. Even though 
her complaint may not flawlessly state 
such a cause of action, the facts were 
sufficiently disclosed that the case she pro-
poses to prove could be found to fall within 
the requirements hereinabove discussed. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in dismiss-
ing the action. 
Reversed. Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
WADE, C. J., and McDONOUGH, J., 
concur. 
CALLISTER, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. The opinion correctly states 
the lawT in cases of this nature. However, 
the complaint in the instant case is deficient 
and fails to state a cause of action. It 
fails to show that the defendant deliberately 
intended to injure the plaintiff by his un-
welcome attentions, or that he knew or 
should have known that his conduct would 
result in severe emotional distress to the 
plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff specifically 
alleges that "The defendant has wilfully, 
wantonly, and with intent to commit unlaw-
ful acts caused plaintiff severe emotional 
distress in the following particulars: De-
fendant has telephoned plaintiff late at 
night, and at other hours, upon at least 15 
and possibly more than 25 separate oc-
casions and has made statements and pro-
posals to plaintiff of a highly insulting, 
obscene and indecent nature, with the 
16. 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079, 62 L.RX 
900. 
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avowed purpose of inducing plaintiff to 
have illicit sexual relations with defendant 
* * *." (Emphasis added) 
The complaint only shows that the alleged 
conduct of the defendant amounted to a 
moral, rather than a legal or actionable, 
wrong.1 
I would affirm the trial court 
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice CALLISTER. 
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FEDERATED MILK PRODUCER'S ASSO-
CIATION, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
STATEWIDE PLUMBING AND HEATING 
COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 9214. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 9, 1961. 
Action for damage to plaintiff's truck 
which turned over after running into a 
windrow of dirt piled by defendant in con-
nection with sewer construction. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., J., entered judgment for plaintiff 
and defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Wade, C. J., held that evidence pre-
sented a question for the jury as to whether 
driver of plaintiff's truck was negligent in 
driving the truck after dark at a speed at 
which the truck could not be stopped within 
the distance substantial objects could be 
seen, even though the driver failed in an ef-
I. Clack v. Thomason, 57 Ga.App. 253, 195 
S.E. 218. 
I. O'Brien v. Alston, 1923, 61 Utah 36$, 
213 P. 791; Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 
1923, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 304; Dalley v. 
Mid-western Dairy Prod. Co., 1932, 80 
fort to stop the truck before it ran into 
windrow of dirt in question. 
Affirmed. 
Callister, J., dissented. 
1. Negligence €=>I36(9) 
Contributory negligence as a matter of 
law is shown only when the evidence to 
that effect is so conclusive that when con-
sidered with all reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff it would be 
unreasonable to find otherwise.1 
2. Automobiles ^=308(11) 
In action for damage to plaintiff's truck 
which turned over after running into a 
windrow of dirt piled by defendant in con-
nection with sewer construction, evidence 
presented a question for the jury as to 
whether driver of plaintiff's truck was neg-
ligent in driving the truck after dark at a 
speed at which the truck could not be 
stopped within the distance substantial ob-
jects could be seen, even though the driver 
failed in an effort to stop the truck before 
it ran into windrow of dirt in question. 
3. Trial <§=29(2) 
A trial judge should not comment on 
the evidence or express his opinion on any 
issue of fact.2 
4. Evidence <§=5(2) 
Observation that everyone who has 
driven an automobile in the nighttime, and 
that every observant person who has ridden 
in an automobile in the nighttime, and has 
met an oncoming automobile with its lights 
on knows that the lights obscure objects be-
hind them for a considerable distance before 
the automobile is reached until a time after 
the lights are passed, is a statement of fact 
susceptible of judicial knowledge as a mat-
ter of law. 
Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309; Lovett v. Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co., 1955, 4 Utah 
2d 76, 78. SO, 286 P.2d 1065. 1066 to 1068. 
2. Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174, 350 P. 
2d 154. 
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PER CURIAM. 
Subsequent to our decision in this case 
heretofore filed, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 
814, a rehearing was granted. Having 
again heard arguments and given further 
consideration to the record and the authori-
ties cited by the parties, the court is not 
disposed to change its position stated in the 
prior opinion. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondent 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
8 Utah 2d 349 
V - l OIL COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANCHOR PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8878. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 27, 1959. 
Action for breach of contract by which 
defendant proposed to supply a certain num-
ber of gallons of gas per month to the 
plaintiff and a minimum quantity subject 
to change by mutual agreement. Judgment 
for the plaintiff in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Jos. G. Jeppson, J., and 
the defendant appeals. The Supreme Court, 
Worthen, J., held that a letter, telephone 
conversation and defendant's conduct were 
sufficient to spell out a modified contract 
by which defendant agreed to go along with 
the plaintiff under the contract. 
Judgment affirmed and case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
Henriod, J., dissented. 
I. Contracts <3=*24, 261(2) 
Gas <§=>I3(I) 
Where defendant proposed by a con-
tract to supply to plaintiff all its require-
ments up to a maximum quantity of certain 
number of gallons per month of gas in a 
minimum quantity, and plaintiff signed the 
contract and returned it to the defendant 
with an explanation that the plaintiff was 
going to be a little slow in starting but ex-
pected to use the total commitment in the 
next year, defendant had the right to re-
ject plaintiff's counteroffer, but also had 
the right to accept it and if it wished to re-
ject the counterproposal defendant should 
have given reasonable notice of such elec-
tion and where it failed to do so the defend-
ant could not terminate the modified con-
tract because of what would have been a 
breach of the original proposal before its 
modification. 
2. Contracts <&=>238(2) 
Gas <S=M3(I) 
Where defendant proposed to supply to 
plaintiff certain number of gallons of gas 
per month and a minimum quantity subject 
to change by mutual contract and plaintiff 
signed it and returned it with a letter stat-
ing that the plaintiff was going to be a little 
slow in starting, but was sure it could use 
the total commitment in the next year, and 
plaintiff talked by telephone explaining that 
it could not meet the minimum requirements 
and defendant replied that it was of no im-
portance, the letter, telephone conversation 
and defendant's conduct, in supplying the 
plaintiff's commitments, absent any further 
evidence, sufficed to spell out a modified 
contract by which the defendant agreed to 
go along with the plaintiff. 
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen, Walter L. 
Budge, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
L. Delos Daines, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
WORTHEN, Justice. 
Defendant filed a petition for an inter-
mediate appeal from the ruling of the trial 
court denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
The appellant, on the 6th day of Sep-
tember, 1954, entered into a contract with 
respondent. The contract provided in part: 
" * * * Quantity: The quantity 
shall be all of the Buyers requirements 
up to a maximum quantity of 40,000 
gallons per month and a minimum 
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Plaintiff received this cancellation and 
termination of the contract November 19, 
1954. Thereafter, on November 21 and 
November 22 plaintiff made two additional 
purchases of 6,507 gallons each. Defendant 
declined to supply plaintiff with petroleum 
after November 30, 1954. 
There was correspondence on October 1, 
4, 6, 12 and 20 concerning price changes on 
the oil without mention of the minimum 
gallonage requirements. 
The issue is narrow indeed. 
Plaintiff contends that the letter which 
accompanied the ''accepted and agreed to" 
contract constituted a modification as to 
the minimum quantities and that the count-
eroffer was accepted by defendant and con-
stituted the final contract of the parties. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff 
breached the agreement and that defend-
ant was entitled to terminate the agree-
ment. It cannot be questioned that de-
fendant was entitled to reject the counter-
offer of plaintiff to purchase less. It is 
equally clear that defendant did not reject 
the same during the proper negotiation 
period, but gave every indication that the 
counterproposal was accepted. 
Had defendant desired to make it clear 
that the conditional acceptance by plaintiff 
of defendant's offer was unacceptable it 
would have been a simple matter to have 
replied to plaintiff's letter of September 6 
rejecting the same. Defendant not only 
failed to reject plaintiff's proposed modifica-
tion but took a course calculated to lead 
plaintiff to conclude that the modification 
was accepted. 
If defendant were unwilling to go along 
with plaintiff under the new conditions he 
should have so indicated. Coupled with 
the statement of defendant over the tele-
phone (that the quantity was not impor-
tant) the course of defendant's conduct in 
taking care of plaintiff's orders certainly 
would lead plaintiff to consider that a new 
contract had been consummated rather than 
to assume that plaintiff's rights were such 
only as defendant would grant. 
quantity of 20,000 per month, quantities 
subject to change by mutual agree-
ment." 
The contract was forwarded unsigned to 
the plaintiff for its signing. The letter of 
transmittal stated: "You may look it over, 
and if it meets with your understanding 
please sign both copies and return * * *." 
Prior to signing the contract plaintiff's man-
ager talked with defendant by telephone, 
explaining that it could not meet the mini-
mum requirements. Plaintiff was advised 
that this was of no importance. Following 
this conversation the plaintiff signed the 
contract, and returned it with a letter which 
stated: 
"Gentlemen: 
"Enclosed find contract executed 
which you forwarded September 1, 
1954. 
"It appears that we are going to be 
a little slow in starting, but I am sure 
we will use the total commitment in the 
next year." 
The defendant signed and returned the 
contract to plaintiff, who received it on 
September 10. The plaintiff purchased no 
products in September. However, in Oc-
tober, it purchased 11,995 gallons supplied 
in three separate orders for 2,797 gallons, 
2,617 gallons and 6,581 gallons. 
On November 16, 1954, plaintiff purchased 
6,546 gallons. Under date of November 17, 
1954, defendant wTote plaintiff by regis-
tered mail requesting return receipt as 
follows: 
"Gentlemen: 
"Please refer to our contract with 
you dated August 31, 1954, effective 
September 1, 1954, covering the pur-
chase by you from us of certain quan-
tities of LP Gas. 
"You are hereby notified, due to your 
failure since September 1, 1954, to 
purchase from us, in accordance with 
the terms of the contract, the minimum 
monthly quantities of LP Gas called 
for by the contract, the contract is 
hereby cancelled and terminated effec-
tive November 30, 1954." 
334 P.2d—48^5 
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[1] Defendant had the right to reject 
plaintiff's counteroffer, but he likewise had 
the right to accept the same. If defendant 
wished to reject the counterproposal he 
should have given reasonable notice of his 
election to do so and having failed he can-
not terminate the modified contract because 
of what would have been a breach of the 
terms of the original proposal before modi-
fied. 
[2] We are of the opinion that the 
letter, the telephone conversation and de-
fendant's conduct, absent any further evi-
dence, are sufficient to spell out a modified 
contract by which defendant agreed to go 
along with plaintiff. 
Judgment affirmed and case remanded for 
further proceedings. Costs to respondent. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WADE and 
MCDONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
I dissent, believing this court should not 
volunteer a decision that a telephone con-
versation, a letter and the silence of de-
fendant constitute an enforceable modifica-
tion of a written, signed contract. First, 
the evidence appears to be inadmissible 
under the parol evidence rule. Second, it 
is not our function to decide matters on the 
merits in affirming an order denying a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
Would the main opinion conclude that 
there was a modified contract had there 
been only a telephone call? Does putting 
the substance of that call on paper and 
sending it through the mail make that which 
was inadmissible admissible? Haven't we 
departed from the parol evidence rule by 
concluding that such evidence effectively 
can vary the terms of a signed, written 
instrument ? 
The evidence presented by plaintiff, which 
the main opinion says creates a new con-
tract is, in substance and effect, an asser-
tion by plaintiff that "I agree to the terms 
of the contract I signed, but I intend to 
breach it. If you terminate the contract 
because of my breach, I will use that very 
breach to sue you for damages for terminat-
ing the contract under a provision therein 
allowing you to so terminate it. In the 
meantime, you must keep on hand enough 
petroleum to satisfy any order I may make 
for the accumulated amount of gallonage 
represented by the amount I did not order 
because of my breach." 
It is difficult to understand how such a 
position taken could be supported by any 
consideration or how it could create a new 
contract under established principles relat-
ing to offer and acceptance. Even though 
we ignore such fundamentals and assume, 
arguendo, that there was a counteroffer,, 
how could we find an enforceable contract 
here, where, through indefiniteness, it is 
impossible to determine whether the plain-
tiff agreed to take 19,999 gallons per month, 
or 1 gallon per month, or any other definite 
amount per month, and where it is impossi-
ble to determine, even, in what months 
the plaintiff will deign to order any gallon-
age or none at all. 
This case is here on interlocutory appeal 
from an order denying a motion for sum-
mary judgment. It is not much unlike 
a case under the old practice where an ap-
peal was taken from the overruling of a 
general demurrer. Our function in deter-
mining whether the trial court erred in 
denying the motion for summary judgment 
is to take a look at the record and if we 
are convinced that the facts adduced up to 
the time the motion was made reflect a 
genuine issue of fact, we simply should af-
firm the lower court and let a jury or a 
court sitting without a jury determine the 
facts in favor of one or the other of the 
litigants. In volunteering that a contract 
was created under the facts presented by 
the plaintiff, we not only invite a jury to 
think that the facts we mention in our de-
cision are true, but in my opinion we en-
courage them to accept them as true, even 
though they may discount the plaintiff en-
tirely. It seems to me that a simple order 
affirming or reversing an order denying a 
motion for summary judgment, together 
with a simple recital of the facts, without 
adjudicating the case on the merits up tc 
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the time of the making of the motion, would 
exhaust our appellate function and in no 
way, even indirectly, could influence the 
fact finder below. 
The motion should have been granted. 
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Sherman S. DALTON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, 
Wayne Rasmussen Company, and Guaran-
tee Insurance Company, Defendants. 
No. 8943. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 30, 1959. 
Proceeding for workmen's compensa-
tion for injuries sustained when used auto-
bile went out of control and off the road 
while claimant was transporting such au-
tomobile from another city to place of 
"business of defendant, a new and used au-
tomobile dealer. The Industrial Commis-
sion denied benefits. On review, the Su-
preme Court, Wade, J., held that there 
was no evidence from which it could rea-
sonably be found that the claimant vol-
unteered to take the trip to the other city 
to drive the automobile back for no re-
muneration. 
Award vacated. 
1. Workmen's Compensation <3=*I439 
In proceeding for workmen's compen-
sation for injuries sustained wThen used 
automobile went out of control and off 
the road while claimant was transporting 
such automobile from another city to place 
of business of defendant, a new and used 
automobile dealer, there was no evidence 
from which it could reasonably be found 
that the claimant volunteered to take the 
*np to the other city to drive the automo-
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bile back for no remuneration. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq.1 
2. Workmen's Compensation <§=1939 
The Industrial Commission has the 
prerogative of making the determination 
of facts which will not be disturbed in 
the absence of capricious or arbitrary ac-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq. 
John L. Black, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
E. R. Callister, Atty. Gen., Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker, Grant Aadnesen, Stephen B. 
Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
WADE, Justice. 
[1] This is a review of a denial by the 
Industrial Commission on a rehearing of 
a claim for benefits under the Workmen's 
Compensation Statutes, U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 
et seq., for injuries received by plaintiff 
while transporting a car from Rock 
Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah for 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company. The 
accident occurred when the automobile 
which plaintiff was driving went out of 
control and off the road on an icy portion 
of Highway 30S about eight miles west 
of Evanston, Wyoming, on February 13, 
1955, resulting in severe injuries to plain-
tiff. 
At the original hearing of this matter 
plaintiff introduced evidence that at the 
time of the accident he and his partner, 
John Porter, leased the back portion of 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company building 
for an automobile repair and maintenance 
business. Although the partnership did a 
lot of work in servicing cars for the Wayne 
Rasmussen Company their business was 
no part of the Rasmussen business. That 
company was in the business of selling 
new and used cars. Both for the purpose 
of purchasing and transporting used cars 
from places distant from its place of busi-
ness in Ogden, Utah, the Wayne Rasmus-
sen Company customarily used regular em-
I. Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093. 
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VI. MODIFICATION, EXTINGUISHMENT, AND RENEWAL 
A. I N GENERAL 
§458. Generally, 
Inasmuch as a contract is a solemn and binding obligation between the 
parties thereto, it cannot be set aside and held for naught by the parties them-
selves without cause unless both parties consent. However, as developed in 
succeeding sections herein,13 contracts may be modified or extinguished in 
many ways. They may be modified, terminated, or rescinded by agreement, or 
they may be rescinded for cause; and a contract may be modified, discharged, 
or replaced by a new or secondary agreement. 
The question of what law, as between the laws of two or more jurisdictions, 
governs the termination or rescission of a contract is considered elsewhere in 
this work,14 The cancellation15 or reformation16 of a contract by court decree is 
likewise elsewhere considered, as is the physical alteration of written contracts.17 
§ 459. New or secondary agreements as affecting prior contracts, generally. 
A contract may be superseded or modified by another contract, in which case 
the superseded or modified contract is usually referred to as the primary con-
tract and the superseding or modifying contract as a secondary agreement.18 
Thus, the parties to any contract, if they continue interested and act upon a 
sufficient consideration while it remains executory, may by a new and later agree-
ment rescind it in whole or in part,, alter or modify it in any respect, add to 
or supplement it, or replace it by a substitute.19 A contract may be super-
ance, the seller may recover according to the 
terms of the contract. Loveland V Havlena, 
50 ND 157, 195 NW 12, 30 ALR 325. 
13. §§ 459 et seq., infra. 
For references to particular forms of secon-
dary agreements which are discussed in other 
articles, see § 459, infra. 
14. See 16 Am Jur 2d, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§49. 
15. See 13 Am Jur 2d, CANCELLATION OF 
INSTRUMENTS. 
16. See REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. 
IT. See 4 Am Jur 2d, ALTERATION OF I N -
STRUMENTS. 
18. A direction to a contractor for the con-
struction of a railroad, to make a continuous 
embankment, instead of barrow pits, makes 
a new contract. Henderson Bridge Co. v 
McGrath, 134 US 260, 33 L ed 934, 10 S Ct 
730. 
The contract between an indorser and the 
indorsee of a promissory note is distinct from 
and independent of that of the maker, and 
the same rights and powers of the parties 
to it exist to alter, revise, or waive the con-
tract of indorsement by mutual consent as 
exist in respect of other contracts. Spann v 
Baltzell, 1 Fla 338. 
19. Savage Arms Corp. v United States, 
266 US 217. 69 L ed 253. 45 S Ct 30: Teal 
v Bilby, 123, US 572, 31 L ed 263, a & Ct 
239; Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v Ray, 101 
US 522, 25 L ed 792; National Surety Corp. 
v Excelsior Springs (CA8 Mo) 123 F2d 573, 
156 ALR 422: Haering Oil Co. v Beasley, 221 
Ark 607, 254 SW2d 951; Boshart v Gardner, 
190 Ark 104, 77 SW2d 642, 96 ALR 1130; 
Taft Realty Corp. v Yorkhaven Enterprises, 
Inc. 146 Conn. 338, 150 A2d 597; Spann v 
Baltzell, 1 Fla 338; Atlas Sewing Center, Inc. 
v Belk's Dept. Store (Fla App) 162 So 2d 
274; Byrd Printing Co. v Whitaker Paper Co. 
135 Ga 865, 70 SE 798; Moses v Loomis, 
156 111 392, 40 NE 952; Quarton v American 
Law Book Co. 143 Iowa 517, 121 NW 1009; 
Bell v Pitman, 143 Ky 521, 136 SW 1026; 
Pancoast v Dinsmore, 105 Me 471, 75 A 43; 
Taylor v Finnigan, 189 Mass 568, 76 NE 
203, 2 LRA NS 973; Gloucester Isinglass & 
Glue Co. v Russia Cement Co. 154 Mass 92, 
27 NE 1005; Spicer v Earl, 41 Mich 191, 
1 NW 923; Business Women's Holding Co. 
v Farmers' & M. Sav. Bank, 194 Minn 171, 
259 NW 812, 99 ALR 576; Lee v Hawks, 
68 Miss 669, 9 So 828; Henning v United 
States Ins. Co. 47 Mo 425; Bandman v Finn, 
185 NY 508, 78 NE 175; Nassoiy v Tomlin-
son, 148 NY 326, 42 NE 715; Thurston v Lud-
wig, 6 Ohio St 1: Webb v Moran. 186 Okla 
140, 96 P2d 308; Stein v Gable Park, Inc. 
223 Or 17, 353 P2d 1034; Dreifus v Colum-
bian Exposition Salvage Co. 194 Pa 475, 45 
A 370: Collver v Moulton, 9 RI 90; Smith 
v Tunno, 6 SC Eq (1 M'Cord) 443; Blood 
v Enos, 12 Vt 625; Hathaway v Lynn, 75 
Wis 186, 43 NW 956. 
Those who have made a contract may al-
9 2 4 
